Chatbots as Interfaces to the Human Knowledge Cloud?
Already at the end of the documented chat No.4 I had the impression, that an interaction with the chatbot chatGBT is somehow different compared to what most people until know have reported or stated in some reflected way about chatGBT.
In a first — and still a little bit vague — conclusion I have stated: “Apropos ‘rational’: that is a point which did surprise me really: as a kind of a summary it came out “that human rationality is composed of emotions, spiritual experience as well as conscious as well as unconscious cognitive processes. This is clearly not what most philosophers today would say. But it follows from the ‘richness of the facts’ which came as a resonance out of this chat. Not that the chatbot would have given this summary in advance as an important characterization of rationality, but as a human counterpart I could summarize all this properties out of the different separated statements [of chatGBT].”
And, indeed, the millions, if not yet billions, of documents in the world wide web are reflecting fragments of knowledge generated by humans which as a whole form a ‘cloud of knowledge’. The reflected echo of the real world through the medium of human brains is distributed in libraries and in the digital space. No individual person as such can make use of it; it is by far too big to be comprehensible.
Meanwhile search-algorithms can help us to make fragments of this ‘human knowledge cloud’ visible, but the search-results so far are ‘transformed’ in a way which is only of very limited use.
My encounter with chatGBT revealed some new glimpses of a possible new paradigm which perhaps wasn’t intended by openai themselves, but which seems now to be in reach: the individual brain has a limited capacity for ‘many documents’, but it has still an incredible ability to ‘transform’ billions of events into complex abstract patterns, inducing complex networks of relations, complex models, even complex theories.
If one looks to a chatbot like chatGBT as an ‘interface’ between a single human person and the ‘human knowledge cloud’, and this by only using ‘everyday language’, then — depending from the quality of the chatbot — this individual human can only with some ideas and questions ‘trigger’ those documents in the huge ‘human knowledge cloud’ which somehow are ‘fitting’ the triggering words. Thus this individual human person is step-wise encountering those fragments of the ‘human knowledge cloud’ which are in ‘resonance’ with his own words. In a bad case this interaction resembles those ‘echo chambers’ of the internet and the real world where people only get back what they put in.
But in a creative case the input of the individual human person can trigger fragments which are somehow confirming, but somehow non-confirming. This can be a trigger onto the the individual human person to generate some new ideas to feed back again the chatbot interface. While the ‘human knowledge cloud’ at a certain moment of time as such is ‘given’ and will not create ‘something new’, an individual person as an ever running learning process (in principle) could generate new aspects and therefore transform the feedbacks out of the ‘human knowledge cloud’ into some ‘new configurations’.
This principle as such is not new. The human brains are working since millions of years with a mechanisms, where the billions of abstract-concrete cognitive entities derived from perceptions and thinking are ‘stored’ in a more or less ‘unconscious space’ called memory, and only if some actual perception or thinking is ‘touching’ some of these stored entities by some ‘kind of similarity’ these will be re-activated and will become part of the actual perceiving and actual thinking. Thus ‘actual new things’ can become merged with ‘past stored things’ forming some new-past construct. This inherent duality of ‘new-past’ is the basis for that important human capability to be able to transcend the almighty presence and escape its clasp.
If we switch to the level of the human population then the ‘Human knowledge cloud’ plays the role of the ‘unconscious memory system’ collecting ‘past things’, and some kinds of chatbots (if they would be good enough) could play the role of the ‘merger mechanism’ bringing together the ‘past’ (given in the ‘Human knowledge cloud’ ) and the ‘presence’ (given in the actual living human person) and it is then up to the human person to generate some useful new-past patterns of thoughts and possible actions.
In case of the chat No.4 the human actor triggered lots of questions and suggestions to get ‘out of the human knowledge cloud’ those fragments which are somehow corresponding to the triggering words. And after about 8000 signs in the chat the chat ended up in these paragraphs:
Human: OK, this all sums up to the conclusion that human rationality is composed of emotions, spiritual experience as well as conscious as well as unconscious cognitive processes. Do I miss something important?
Machine (citing human documents): No, you have accurately summed up the components of human rationality. Additionally, human rationality is also composed of social and cultural influences, which can shape and inform our understanding of the world and our decisions. Additionally, human rationality is often impacted by our values and beliefs, which can provide a moral foundation for our behavior and decision making. Finally, human rationality is also impacted by our environment, which can provide a source of information and insight.
By itself the chatbot would not have been able to start with such a characterization. He can ‘reach out’ in the ‘Human knowledge cloud’, but the bot algorithm as such has not — as far as research can see at the moment — any kind of ‘creative rational power’ to transform the ‘given knowledge’ into some new ‘helpful’ knowledge. But at the other side, the human persons would not be able too to make use of ‘all the available knowledge’.
In the course of interaction the human questions could ‘drive’ the bot to collect ‘interesting facts’which could then become ‘accepted’ by the bot because they haven become ‘part of the chat’. Thus at the end of the chat the bot could accept that that human rationality is composed of emotions, spiritual experience as well as conscious as well as unconscious cognitive processes. A human person ‘helped him’ to state this. This bot algorithm as such does not know anything and he cannot understand anything. Because chatbots — until now — do not possess real emotions, no real mystical experience, no unconscious or conscious human-like cognitive processes, they have no intelligence int the human format.
It is an open question what kind of ‘intelligence’ they have at all. Until know there is great number of ‘definitions’ around. No one is accepted as ‘that’ definition, especially the relationship between the ‘collection of machine intelligence definitions’ and the possible — also not really existing — collection of ‘human intelligence definitions’ is more or less unclear. Thus we are somehow ‘dreaming’ of intelligence, but nobody can really explain what it is …. We could seriously try, if we want …. but who wants it?
The whole text shows a dynamic, which induces many changes. Difficult to plan ‘in advance’.
Perhaps, some time, it will look like a ‘book’, at least ‘for a moment’.
I have started a ‘book project’ in parallel. This was motivated by the need to provide potential users of our new oksimo.R software with a coherent explanation of how the oksimo.R software, when used, generates an empirical theory in the format of a screenplay. The primary source of the book is in German and will be translated step by step here in the uffmm.blog.
In a rather foundational paper about an idea, how one can generalize ‘systems engineering’ [*1] to the art of ‘theory engineering’  a new conceptual framework has been outlined for a ‘sustainable applied empirical theory (SAET)’. Part of this new framework has been the idea that the classical recourse to groups of special experts (mostly ‘engineers’ in engineering) is too restrictive in the light of the new requirement of being sustainable: sustainability is primarily based on ‘diversity’ combined with the ‘ability to predict’ from this diversity probable future states which keep life alive. The aspect of diversity induces the challenge to see every citizen as a ‘natural expert’, because nobody can know in advance and from some non-existing absolut point of truth, which knowledge is really important. History shows that the ‘mainstream’ is usually to a large degree ‘biased’ [*1b].
With this assumption, that every citizen is a ‘natural expert’, science turns into a ‘general science’ where all citizens are ‘natural members’ of science. I will call this more general concept of science ‘sustainable citizen science (SCS)’ or ‘Citizen Science 2.0 (CS2)’. The important point here is that a sustainable citizen science is not necessarily an ‘arbitrary’ process. While the requirement of ‘diversity’ relates to possible contents, to possible ideas, to possible experiments, and the like, it follows from the other requirement of ‘predictability’/ of being able to make some useful ‘forecasts’, that the given knowledge has to be in a format, which allows in a transparent way the construction of some consequences, which ‘derive’ from the ‘given’ knowledge and enable some ‘new’ knowledge. This ability of forecasting has often been understood as the business of ‘logic’ providing an ‘inference concept’ given by ‘rules of deduction’ and a ‘practical pattern (on the meta level)’, which defines how these rules have to be applied to satisfy the inference concept. But, looking to real life, to everyday life or to modern engineering and economy, one can learn that ‘forecasting’ is a complex process including much more than only cognitive structures nicely fitting into some formulas. For this more realistic forecasting concept we will use here the wording ‘common logic’ and for the cognitive adventure where common logic is applied we will use the wording ‘common science’. ‘Common science’ is structurally not different from ‘usual science’, but it has a substantial wider scope and is using the whole of mankind as ‘experts’.
The following chapters/ sections try to illustrate this common science view by visiting different special views which all are only ‘parts of a whole’, a whole which we can ‘feel’ in every moment, but which we can not yet completely grasp with our theoretical concepts.
Language (Main message: “The ordinary language is the ‘meta language’ to every special language. This can be used as a ‘hint’ to something really great: the mystery of the ‘self-creating’ power of the ordinary language which for most people is unknown although it happens every moment.”)
Concrete Abstract Statements (Main message: “… you will probably detect, that nearly all words of a language are ‘abstract words’ activating ‘abstract meanings’. …If you cannot provide … ‘concrete situations’ the intended meaning of your abstract words will stay ‘unclear’: they can mean ‘nothing or all’, depending from the decoding of the hearer.”)
True False Undefined (Main message: “… it reveals that ’empirical (observational) evidence’ is not necessarily an automatism: it presupposes appropriate meaning spaces embedded in sets of preferences, which are ‘observation friendly’.“
Beyond Now (Main message: “With the aid of … sequences revealing possible changes the NOW is turned into a ‘moment’ embedded in a ‘process’, which is becoming the more important reality. The NOW is something, but the PROCESS is more.“)
Playing with the Future (Main message: “In this sense seems ‘language’ to be the master tool for every brain to mediate its dynamic meaning structures with symbolic fix points (= words, expressions) which as such do not change, but the meaning is ‘free to change’ in any direction. And this ‘built in ‘dynamics’ represents an ‘internal potential’ for uncountable many possible states, which could perhaps become ‘true’ in some ‘future state’. Thus ‘future’ can begin in these potentials, and thinking is the ‘playground’ for possible futures.(but see )”)
Forecasting – Prediction: What? (This chapter explains the cognitive machinery behind forecasting/ predictions, how groups of human actors can elaborate shared descriptions, and how it is possible to start with sequences of singularities to built up a growing picture of the empirical world which appears as a radical infinite and indeterministic space. )
!!! From here all the following chapters have to be re-written !!!
/* Often people argue against the usage of the wikipedia encyclopedia as not ‘scientific’ because the ‘content’ of an entry in this encyclopedia can ‘change’. This presupposes the ‘classical view’ of scientific texts to be ‘stable’, which presupposes further, that such a ‘stable text’ describes some ‘stable subject matter’. But this view of ‘steadiness’ as the major property of ‘true descriptions’ is in no correspondence with real scientific texts! The reality of empirical science — even as in some special disciplines like ‘physics’ — is ‘change’. Looking to Aristotle’s view of nature, to Galileo Galilei, to Newton, to Einstein and many others, you will not find a ‘single steady picture’ of nature and science, and physics is only a very simple strand of science compared to the live-sciences and many others. Thus wikipedia is a real scientific encyclopedia give you the breath of world knowledge with all its strengths and limits at once. For another, more general argument, see In Favour for Wikipedia */
[*1] Meaning operator ‘…’ : In this text (and in nearly all other texts of this author) the ‘inverted comma’ is used quite heavily. In everyday language this is not common. In some special languages (theory of formal languages or in programming languages or in meta-logic) the inverted comma is used in some special way. In this text, which is primarily a philosophical text, the inverted comma sign is used as a ‘meta-language operator’ to raise the intention of the reader to be aware, that the ‘meaning’ of the word enclosed in the inverted commas is ‘text specific’: in everyday language usage the speaker uses a word and assumes tacitly that his ‘intended meaning’ will be understood by the hearer of his utterance as ‘it is’. And the speaker will adhere to his assumption until some hearer signals, that her understanding is different. That such a difference is signaled is quite normal, because the ‘meaning’ which is associated with a language expression can be diverse, and a decision, which one of these multiple possible meanings is the ‘intended one’ in a certain context is often a bit ‘arbitrary’. Thus, it can be — but must not — a meta-language strategy, to comment to the hearer (or here: the reader), that a certain expression in a communication is ‘intended’ with a special meaning which perhaps is not the commonly assumed one. Nevertheless, because the ‘common meaning’ is no ‘clear and sharp subject’, a ‘meaning operator’ with the inverted commas has also not a very sharp meaning. But in the ‘game of language’ it is more than nothing 🙂
[*1b] That the main stream ‘is biased’ is not an accident, not a ‘strange state’, not a ‘failure’, it is the ‘normal state’ based on the deeper structure how human actors are ‘built’ and ‘genetically’ and ‘cultural’ ‘programmed’. Thus the challenge to ‘survive’ as part of the ‘whole biosphere’ is not a ‘partial task’ to solve a single problem, but to solve in some sense the problem how to ‘shape the whole biosphere’ in a way, which enables a live in the universe for the time beyond that point where the sun is turning into a ‘red giant’ whereby life will be impossible on the planet earth (some billion years ahead). A remarkable text supporting this ‘complex view of sustainability’ can be found in Clark and Harvey, summarized at the end of the text. 
[*2] The meaning of the expression ‘normal’ is comparable to a wicked problem. In a certain sense we act in our everyday world ‘as if there exists some standard’ for what is assumed to be ‘normal’. Look for instance to houses, buildings: to a certain degree parts of a house have a ‘standard format’ assuming ‘normal people’. The whole traffic system, most parts of our ‘daily life’ are following certain ‘standards’ making ‘planning’ possible. But there exists a certain percentage of human persons which are ‘different’ compared to these introduced standards. We say that they have a ‘handicap’ compared to this assumed ‘standard’, but this so-called ‘standard’ is neither 100% true nor is the ‘given real world’ in its properties a ‘100% subject’. We have learned that ‘properties of the real world’ are distributed in a rather ‘statistical manner’ with different probabilities of occurrences. To ‘find our way’ in these varying occurrences we try to ‘mark’ the main occurrences as ‘normal’ to enable a basic structure for expectations and planning. Thus, if in this text the expression ‘normal’ is used it refers to the ‘most common occurrences’.
[*3] Thus we have here a ‘threefold structure’ embracing ‘perception events, memory events, and expression events’. Perception events represent ‘concrete events’; memory events represent all kinds of abstract events but they all have a ‘handle’ which maps to subsets of concrete events; expression events are parts of an abstract language system, which as such is dynamically mapped onto the abstract events. The main source for our knowledge about perceptions, memory and expressions is experimental psychology enhanced by many other disciplines.
[*4] Characterizing language expressions by meaning – the fate of any grammar: the sentence ” … ‘words’ (= expressions) of a language which can activate such abstract meanings are understood as ‘abstract words’, ‘general words’, ‘category words’ or the like.” is pointing to a deep property of every ordinary language, which represents the real power of language but at the same time the great weakness too: expressions as such have no meaning. Hundreds, thousands, millions of words arranged in ‘texts’, ‘documents’ can show some statistical patterns’ and as such these patterns can give some hint which expressions occur ‘how often’ and in ‘which combinations’, but they never can give a clue to the associated meaning(s). During more than three-thousand years humans have tried to describe ordinary language in a more systematic way called ‘grammar’. Due to this radically gap between ‘expressions’ as ‘observable empirical facts’ and ‘meaning constructs’ hidden inside the brain it was all the time a difficult job to ‘classify’ expressions as representing a certain ‘type’ of expression like ‘nouns’, ‘predicates’, ‘adjectives’, ‘defining article’ and the like. Without regressing to the assumed associated meaning such a classification is not possible. On account of the fuzziness of every meaning ‘sharp definitions’ of such ‘word classes’ was never and is not yet possible. One of the last big — perhaps the biggest ever — project of a complete systematic grammar of a language was the grammar project of the ‘Akademie der Wissenschaften der DDR’ (‘Academy of Sciences of the GDR’) from 1981 with the title “Grundzüge einer Deutschen Grammatik” (“Basic features of a German grammar”). A huge team of scientists worked together using many modern methods. But in the preface you can read, that many important properties of the language are still not sufficiently well describable and explainable. See: Karl Erich Heidolph, Walter Flämig, Wolfgang Motsch et al.: Grundzüge einer deutschen Grammatik. Akademie, Berlin 1981, 1028 Seiten.
[*5] Differing opinions about a given situation manifested in uttered expressions are a very common phenomenon in everyday communication. In some sense this is ‘natural’, can happen, and it should be no substantial problem to ‘solve the riddle of being different’. But as you can experience, the ability of people to solve the occurrence of different opinions is often quite weak. Culture is suffering by this as a whole.
 Gerd Doeben-Henisch, 2022, From SYSTEMS Engineering to THEORYEngineering, see: https://www.uffmm.org/2022/05/26/from-systems-engineering-to-theory-engineering/(Remark: At the time of citation this post was not yet finished, because there are other posts ‘corresponding’ with that post, which are too not finished. Knowledge is a dynamic network of interwoven views …).
[1d] ‘usual science’ is the game of science without having a sustainable format like in citizen science 2.0.
 Science, see e.g. wkp-en: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Science
Citation = “In modern science, the term “theory” refers to scientific theories, a well-confirmed type of explanation of nature, made in a way consistent with the scientific method, and fulfilling the criteria required by modern science. Such theories are described in such a way that scientific tests should be able to provide empirical support for it, or empirical contradiction (“falsify“) of it. Scientific theories are the most reliable, rigorous, and comprehensive form of scientific knowledge, in contrast to more common uses of the word “theory” that imply that something is unproven or speculative (which in formal terms is better characterized by the word hypothesis). Scientific theories are distinguished from hypotheses, which are individual empirically testableconjectures, and from scientific laws, which are descriptive accounts of the way nature behaves under certain conditions.”
[2b] History of science in wkp-en: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_science#Scientific_Revolution_and_birth_of_New_Science
 Theory, see wkp-en: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theory#:~:text=A%20theory%20is%20a%20rational,or%20no%20discipline%20at%20all.
Citation = “A theory is a rational type of abstract thinking about a phenomenon, or the results of such thinking. The process of contemplative and rational thinking is often associated with such processes as observational study or research. Theories may be scientific, belong to a non-scientific discipline, or no discipline at all. Depending on the context, a theory’s assertions might, for example, include generalized explanations of how nature works. The word has its roots in ancient Greek, but in modern use it has taken on several related meanings.”
Citation = “In modern science, the term “theory” refers to scientific theories, a well-confirmed type of explanation of nature, made in a way consistent with the scientific method, and fulfilling the criteria required by modern science. Such theories are described in such a way that scientific tests should be able to provide empirical support for it, or empirical contradiction (“falsify“) of it. Scientific theories are the most reliable, rigorous, and comprehensive form of scientific knowledge, in contrast to more common uses of the word “theory” that imply that something is unproven or speculative (which in formal terms is better characterized by the word hypothesis). Scientific theories are distinguished from hypotheses, which are individual empirically testableconjectures, and from scientific laws, which are descriptive accounts of the way nature behaves under certain conditions.”
[4b] Empiricism in wkp-en: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Empiricism
Citation =”The scientific method is an empirical method of acquiring knowledge that has characterized the development of science since at least the 17th century (with notable practitioners in previous centuries). It involves careful observation, applying rigorous skepticism about what is observed, given that cognitive assumptions can distort how one interprets the observation. It involves formulating hypotheses, via induction, based on such observations; experimental and measurement-based statistical testing of deductions drawn from the hypotheses; and refinement (or elimination) of the hypotheses based on the experimental findings. These are principles of the scientific method, as distinguished from a definitive series of steps applicable to all scientific enterprises. [4c]
Citation = “The purpose of an experiment is to determine whether observations[A][a][b] agree with or conflict with the expectations deduced from a hypothesis.: Book I, [6.54] pp.372, 408 [b] Experiments can take place anywhere from a garage to a remote mountaintop to CERN’s Large Hadron Collider. There are difficulties in a formulaic statement of method, however. Though the scientific method is often presented as a fixed sequence of steps, it represents rather a set of general principles. Not all steps take place in every scientific inquiry (nor to the same degree), and they are not always in the same order.”
 Gerd Doeben-Henisch, “Is Mathematics a Fake? No! Discussing N.Bourbaki, Theory of Sets (1968) – Introduction”, 2022, https://www.uffmm.org/2022/06/06/n-bourbaki-theory-of-sets-1968-introduction/
 Logic, see wkp-en: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logic
 W. C. Kneale, The Development of Logic, Oxford University Press (1962)
 Set theory, in wkp-en: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Set_theory
 N.Bourbaki, Theory of Sets , 1968, with a chapter about structures, see: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/%C3%89l%C3%A9ments_de_math%C3%A9matique
 = 
 Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein ( 1889 – 1951): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ludwig_Wittgenstein
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 Wikipedia EN, Speech acts: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speech_act
 While the world view constructed in a brain is ‘virtual’ compared to the ‘real word’ outside the brain (where the body outside the brain is also functioning as ‘real world’ in relation to the brain), does the ‘virtual world’ in the brain function for the brain mostly ‘as if it is the real world’. Only under certain conditions can the brain realize a ‘difference’ between the triggering outside real world and the ‘virtual substitute for the real world’: You want to use your bicycle ‘as usual’ and then suddenly you have to notice that it is not at that place where is ‘should be’. …
 Propositional Calculus, see wkp-en: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Propositional_calculus#:~:text=Propositional%20calculus%20is%20a%20branch,of%20arguments%20based%20on%20them.
 Boolean algebra, see wkp-en: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boolean_algebra
 Boolean (or propositional) Logic: As one can see in the mentioned articles of the English wikipedia, the term ‘boolean logic’ is not common. The more logic-oriented authors prefer the term ‘boolean calculus’  and the more math-oriented authors prefer the term ‘boolean algebra’ . In the view of this author the general view is that of ‘language use’ with ‘logic inference’ as leading idea. Therefore the main topic is ‘logic’, in the case of propositional logic reduced to a simple calculus whose similarity with ‘normal language’ is widely ‘reduced’ to a play with abstract names and operators. Recommended: the historical comments in .
 Clearly, thinking alone can not necessarily induce a possible state which along the time line will become a ‘real state’. There are numerous factors ‘outside’ the individual thinking which are ‘driving forces’ to push real states to change. But thinking can in principle synchronize with other individual thinking and — in some cases — can get a ‘grip’ on real factors causing real changes.
 This kind of knowledge is not delivered by brain science alone but primarily from experimental (cognitive) psychology which examines observable behavior and ‘interprets’ this behavior with functional models within an empirical theory.
 Predicate Logic or First-Order Logic or … see: wkp-en: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First-order_logic#:~:text=First%2Dorder%20logic%E2%80%94also%20known,%2C%20linguistics%2C%20and%20computer%20science.
 Gerd Doeben-Henisch, In Favour of Wikipedia, https://www.uffmm.org/2022/07/31/in-favour-of-wikipedia/, 31 July 2022
 The sun, see wkp-ed https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sun (accessed 8 Aug 2022)
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 The idea that individual disciplines are not good enough for the ‘whole of knowledge’ is expressed in a clear way in a video of the theoretical physicist and philosopher Carlo Rovell: Carlo Rovelli on physics and philosophy, June 1, 2022, Video from the Perimeter Institute for Theoretical Physics. Theoretical physicist, philosopher, and international bestselling author Carlo Rovelli joins Lauren and Colin for a conversation about the quest for quantum gravity, the importance of unlearning outdated ideas, and a very unique way to get out of a speeding ticket.
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/* Comment: Gro Harlem Brundtland (Norway) has been the main coordinator of this document */
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Abstract: Extrapolating Beyond Suboptimal Demonstrations via Inverse Reinforcement Learning from Observations Daniel S. Brown * 1 Wonjoon Goo * 1 Prabhat Nagarajan 2 Scott Niekum 1 You can read in the abstract: “A critical flaw of existing inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) methods is their inability to significantly outperform the demonstrator. This is because IRL typically seeks a reward function that makes the demonstrator appear near-optimal, rather than inferring the underlying intentions of the demonstrator that may have been poorly executed in practice. In this paper, we introduce a novel reward-learning-from-observation algorithm, Trajectory-ranked Reward EXtrapolation (T-REX), that extrapolates beyond a set of (ap- proximately) ranked demonstrations in order to infer high-quality reward functions from a set of potentially poor demonstrations. When combined with deep reinforcement learning, T-REX outperforms state-of-the-art imitation learning and IRL methods on multiple Atari and MuJoCo bench- mark tasks and achieves performance that is often more than twice the performance of the best demonstration. We also demonstrate that T-REX is robust to ranking noise and can accurately extrapolate intention by simply watching a learner noisily improve at a task over time.”
In the abstract you can read: “For sophisticated reinforcement learning (RL) systems to interact usefully with real-world environments, we need to communicate complex goals to these systems. In this work, we explore goals defined in terms of (non-expert) human preferences between pairs of trajectory segments. We show that this approach can effectively solve complex RL tasks without access to the reward function, including Atari games and simulated robot locomotion, while providing feedback on less than one percent of our agent’s interactions with the environment. This reduces the cost of human oversight far enough that it can be practically applied to state-of-the-art RL systems. To demonstrate the flexibility of our approach, we show that we can successfully train complex novel behaviors with about an hour of human time. These behaviors and environments are considerably more complex than any that have been previously learned from human feedback.
In the abstract you can read: “Conceptual abstraction and analogy-making are key abilities underlying humans’ abilities to learn, reason, and robustly adapt their knowledge to new domains. Despite of a long history of research on constructing AI systems with these abilities, no current AI system is anywhere close to a capability of forming humanlike abstractions or analogies. This paper reviews the advantages and limitations of several approaches toward this goal, including symbolic methods, deep learning, and probabilistic program induction. The paper concludes with several proposals for designing challenge tasks and evaluation measures in order to make quantifiable and generalizable progress
In the abstract you can read: “Since its beginning in the 1950s, the field of artificial intelligence has cycled several times between periods of optimistic predictions and massive investment (“AI spring”) and periods of disappointment, loss of confidence, and reduced funding (“AI winter”). Even with today’s seemingly fast pace of AI breakthroughs, the development of long-promised technologies such as self-driving cars, housekeeping robots, and conversational companions has turned out to be much harder than many people expected. One reason for these repeating cycles is our limited understanding of the nature and complexity of intelligence itself. In this paper I describe four fallacies in common assumptions made by AI researchers, which can lead to overconfident predictions about the field. I conclude by discussing the open questions spurred by these fallacies, including the age-old challenge of imbuing machines with humanlike common sense.”
 Stuart Russell, (2019), Human Compatible: AI and the Problem of Control, Penguin books, Allen Lane; 1. Edition (8. Oktober 2019)
In the preface you can read: “This book is about the past , present , and future of our attempt to understand and create intelligence . This matters , not because AI is rapidly becoming a pervasive aspect of the present but because it is the dominant technology of the future . The world’s great powers are waking up to this fact , and the world’s largest corporations have known it for some time . We cannot predict exactly how the technology will develop or on what timeline . Nevertheless , we must plan for the possibility that machines will far exceed the human capacity for decision making in the real world . What then ? Everything civilization has to offer is the product of our intelligence ; gaining access to considerably greater intelligence would be the biggest event in human history . The purpose of the book is to explain why it might be the last event in human history and how to make sure that it is not .”
 David Adkins, Bilal Alsallakh, Adeel Cheema, Narine Kokhlikyan, Emily McReynolds, Pushkar Mishra, Chavez Procope, Jeremy Sawruk, Erin Wang, Polina Zvyagina, (2022), Method Cards for Prescriptive Machine-Learning Transparency, 2022 IEEE/ACM 1st International Conference on AI Engineering – Software Engineering for AI (CAIN), CAIN’22, May 16–24, 2022, Pittsburgh, PA, USA, pp. 90 – 100, Association for Computing Machinery, ACM ISBN 978-1-4503-9275-4/22/05, New York, NY, USA, https://doi.org/10.1145/3522664.3528600
In the abstract you can read: “Specialized documentation techniques have been developed to communicate key facts about machine-learning (ML) systems and the datasets and models they rely on. Techniques such as Datasheets, AI FactSheets, and Model Cards have taken a mainly descriptive approach, providing various details about the system components. While the above information is essential for product developers and external experts to assess whether the ML system meets their requirements, other stakeholders might find it less actionable. In particular, ML engineers need guidance on how to mitigate po- tential shortcomings in order to fix bugs or improve the system’s performance. We propose a documentation artifact that aims to provide such guidance in a prescriptive way. Our proposal, called Method Cards, aims to increase the transparency and reproducibil- ity of ML systems by allowing stakeholders to reproduce the models, understand the rationale behind their designs, and introduce adap- tations in an informed way. We showcase our proposal with an example in small object detection, and demonstrate how Method Cards can communicate key considerations that help increase the transparency and reproducibility of the detection model. We fur- ther highlight avenues for improving the user experience of ML engineers based on Method Cards.”
 John H. Miller, (2022), Ex Machina: Coevolving Machines and the Origins of the Social Universe, The SFI Press Scholars Series, 410 pages Paperback ISBN: 978-1947864429 , DOI: 10.37911/9781947864429
In the announcement of the book you can read: “If we could rewind the tape of the Earth’s deep history back to the beginning and start the world anew—would social behavior arise yet again? While the study of origins is foundational to many scientific fields, such as physics and biology, it has rarely been pursued in the social sciences. Yet knowledge of something’s origins often gives us new insights into the present. In Ex Machina, John H. Miller introduces a methodology for exploring systems of adaptive, interacting, choice-making agents, and uses this approach to identify conditions sufficient for the emergence of social behavior. Miller combines ideas from biology, computation, game theory, and the social sciences to evolve a set of interacting automata from asocial to social behavior. Readers will learn how systems of simple adaptive agents—seemingly locked into an asocial morass—can be rapidly transformed into a bountiful social world driven only by a series of small evolutionary changes. Such unexpected revolutions by evolution may provide an important clue to the emergence of social life.”
In the abstract you can read: “Analyzing the spatial and temporal properties of information flow with a multi-century perspective could illuminate the sustainability of human resource-use strategies. This paper uses historical and archaeological datasets to assess how spatial, temporal, cognitive, and cultural limitations impact the generation and flow of information about ecosystems within past societies, and thus lead to tradeoffs in sustainable practices. While it is well understood that conflicting priorities can inhibit successful outcomes, case studies from Eastern Polynesia, the North Atlantic, and the American Southwest suggest that imperfect information can also be a major impediment to sustainability. We formally develop a conceptual model of Environmental Information Flow and Perception (EnIFPe) to examine the scale of information flow to a society and the quality of the information needed to promote sustainable coupled natural-human systems. In our case studies, we assess key aspects of information flow by focusing on food web relationships and nutrient flows in socio-ecological systems, as well as the life cycles, population dynamics, and seasonal rhythms of organisms, the patterns and timing of species’ migration, and the trajectories of human-induced environmental change. We argue that the spatial and temporal dimensions of human environments shape society’s ability to wield information, while acknowledging that varied cultural factors also focus a society’s ability to act on such information. Our analyses demonstrate the analytical importance of completed experiments from the past, and their utility for contemporary debates concerning managing imperfect information and addressing conflicting priorities in modern environmental management and resource use.”
Before one starts the HMI analysis some stakeholder — in our case are the users stakeholder as well as users in one role — have to present some given situation — classifiable as a ‘problem’ — to depart from and a vision as the envisioned goal to be realized.
Here we give a short description of the problem for the CM:MI paradigm and the vision, what should be gained.
Problem: Mankind on the Planet Earth
In this project the mankind on the planet earth is understood as the primary problem. ‘Mankind’ is seen here as the life form called homo sapiens. Based on the findings of biological evolution one can state that the homo sapiens has — besides many other wonderful capabilities — at least two extraordinary capabilities:
Outside to Inside
The whole body with the brain is able to convert continuously body-external events into internal, neural events. And the brain inside the body receives many events inside the body as external events too. Thus in the brain we can observe a mixup of body-external (outside 1) and body-internal events (outside 2), realized as set of billions of neural processes, highly interrelated. Most of these neural processes are unconscious, a small part is conscious. Nevertheless these unconscious and conscious events are neurally interrelated. This overall conversion from outside 1 and outside 2 into neural processes can be seen as a mapping. As we know today from biology, psychology and brain sciences this mapping is not a 1-1 mapping. The brain does all the time a kind of filtering — mostly unconscious — sorting out only those events which are judged by the brain to be important. Furthermore the brain is time-slicing all its sensory inputs, storing these time-slices (called ‘memories’), whereby these time-slices again are no 1-1 copies. The storing of time-sclices is a complex (unconscious) process with many kinds of operations like structuring, associating, abstracting, evaluating, and more. From this one can deduce that the content of an individual brain and the surrounding reality of the own body as well as the world outside the own body can be highly different. All kinds of perceived and stored neural events which can be or can become conscious are here called conscious cognitive substrates or cognitive objects.
Inside to Outside (to Inside)
Generally it is known that the homo sapiens can produce with its body events which have some impact on the world outside the body. One kind of such events is the production of all kinds of movements, including gestures, running, grasping with hands, painting, writing as well as sounds by his voice. What is of special interest here are forms of communications between different humans, and even more specially those communications enabled by the spoken sounds of a language as well as the written signs of a language. Spoken sounds as well as written signs are here called expressions associated with a known language. Expressions as such have no meaning (A non-speaker of a language L can hear or see expressions of the language L but he/she/x never will understand anything). But as everyday experience shows nearly every child starts very soon to learn which kinds of expressions belong to a language and with what kinds of shared experiences they can be associated. This learning is related to many complex neural processes which map expressions internally onto — conscious and unconscious — cognitive objects (including expressions!). This mapping builds up an internal meaning function from expressions into cognitive objects and vice versa. Because expressions have a dual face (being internal neural structures as well as being body-outside events by conversions from the inside to body-outside) it is possible that a homo sapiens can transmit its internal encoding of cognitive objects into expressions from his inside to the outside and thereby another homo sapiens can perceive the produced outside expression and can map this outside expression into an intern expression. As far as the meaning function of of the receiving homo sapiens is sufficiently similar to the meaning function of the sending homo sapiens there exists some probability that the receiving homo sapiens can activate from its memory cognitive objects which have some similarity with those of the sending homo sapiens.
Although we know today of different kinds of animals having some form of language, there is no species known which is with regard to language comparable to the homo sapiens. This explains to a large extend why the homo sapiens population was able to cooperate in a way, which not only can include many persons but also can stretch through long periods of time and can include highly complex cognitive objects and associated behavior.
In 2006 I introduced the term negative complexity in my writings to describe the fact that in the world surrounding an individual person there is an amount of language-encoded meaning available which is beyond the capacity of an individual brain to be processed. Thus whatever kind of experience or knowledge is accumulated in libraries and data bases, if the negative complexity is higher and higher than this knowledge can no longer help individual persons, whole groups, whole populations in a constructive usage of all this. What happens is that the intended well structured ‘sound’ of knowledge is turned into a noisy environment which crashes all kinds of intended structures into nothing or badly deformed somethings.
From Quantum Mechanics we know the idea of entangled states. But we must not dig into quantum mechanics to find other phenomena which manifest entangled states. Look around in your everyday world. There exist many occasions where a human person is acting in a situation, but the bodily separateness is a fake. While sitting before a laptop in a room the person is communicating within an online session with other persons. And depending from the social role and the membership in some social institution and being part of some project this person will talk, perceive, feel, decide etc. with regard to the known rules of these social environments which are represented as cognitive objects in its brain. Thus by knowledge, by cognition, the individual person is in its situation completely entangled with other persons which know from these roles and rules and following thereby in their behavior these rules too. Sitting with the body in a certain physical location somewhere on the planet does not matter in this moment. The primary reality is this cognitive space in the brains of the participating persons.
If you continue looking around in your everyday world you will probably detect that the everyday world is full of different kinds of cognitively induced entangled states of persons. These internalized structures are functioning like protocols, like scripts, like rules in a game, telling everybody what is expected from him/her/x, and to that extend, that people adhere to such internalized protocols, the daily life has some structure, has some stability, enables planning of behavior where cooperation between different persons is necessary. In a cognitively enabled entangled state the individual person becomes a member of something greater, becoming a super person. Entangled persons can do things which usually are not possible as long you are working as a pure individual person.
Entangled Humans and Negative Complexity
Although entangled human persons can principally enable more complex events, structures, processes, engineering, cultural work than single persons, human entanglement is still limited by the brain capacities as well as by the limits of normal communication. Increasing the amount of meaning relevant artifacts or increasing the velocity of communication events makes things even more worse. There are objective limits for human processing, which can run into negative complexity.
Future is not Waiting
The term ‘future‘ is cognitively empty: there exists nowhere an object which can be called ‘future’. What we have is some local actual presence (the Now), which the body is turning into internal representations of some kind (becoming the Past), but something like a future does not exist, nowhere. Our knowledge about the future is radically zero.
Nevertheless, because our bodies are part of a physical world (planet, solar system, …) and our entangled scientific work has identified some regularities of this physical world which can be bused for some predictions what could happen with some probability as assumed states where our clocks are showing a different time stamp. But because there are many processes running in parallel, composed of billions of parameters which can be tuned in many directions, a really good forecast is not simple and depends from so many presuppositions.
Since the appearance of homo sapiens some hundred thousands years ago in Africa the homo sapiens became a game changer which makes all computations nearly impossible. Not in the beginning of the appearance of the homo sapiens, but in the course of time homo sapiens enlarged its number, improved its skills in more and more areas, and meanwhile we know, that homo sapiens indeed has started to crash more and more the conditions of its own life. And principally thinking points out, that homo sapiens could even crash more than only planet earth. Every exemplar of a homo sapiens has a built-in freedom which allows every time to decide to behave in a different way (although in everyday life we are mostly following some protocols). And this built-in freedom is guided by actual knowledge, by emotions, and by available resources. The same child can become a great musician, a great mathematician, a philosopher, a great political leader, an engineer, … but giving the child no resources, depriving it from important social contexts, giving it the wrong knowledge, it can not manifest its freedom in full richness. As human population we need the best out of all children.
Because the processing of the planet, the solar system etc. is going on, we are in need of good forecasts of possible futures, beyond our classical concepts of sharing knowledge. This is where our vision enters.
VISION: DEVELOPING TOGETHER POSSIBLE FUTURES
To find possible and reliable shapes of possible futures we have to exploit all experiences, all knowledge, all ideas, all kinds of creativity by using maximal diversity. Because present knowledge can be false — as history tells us –, we should not rule out all those ideas, which seem to be too crazy at a first glance. Real innovations are always different to what we are used to at that time. Thus the following text is a first rough outline of the vision:
Find a format
which allows anykinds of people
for any kind of given problem
with at least one vision of a possible improvement
to search and to find a path leading from the given problem (Now) to the envisioned improved state (future).
For all needed communication any kind of everyday language should be enough.
As needed this everyday language should be extendable with special expressions.
These considerations about possible paths into the wanted envisioned future state should continuously be supported by appropriate automaticsimulations of such a path.
These simulations should include automatic evaluations based on the given envisioned state.
As far as possible adaptive algorithms should be available to support the search, finding and identification of the best cases (referenced by the visions) within human planning.
REFERENCES or COMMENTS
 One of the most common entangled state in daily life is the usage of normal language! A normal language L works only because the rules of usage of this language L are shared by all speaker-hearer of this language, and these rules are explicit cognitive structures (not necessarily conscious, mostly unconscious!).
Applying the original P-V-Pref Document structure to real cases it became clear that the everyday logic behind the classification of facts into problems [P] or visions [V] follows a kind of logic hidden in the semantic space of the used expressions. This text explains this hidden logic and what this means for our application.
While the general view of the whole process is quite clear there arose some hot debate about the everyday situation of the experts (here: citizens) and the concepts ‘reality [R]‘, ‘vision [V] (imagination of a state which is not yet real)’, ‘problem [P]‘, and ‘preference [Pref]‘. The members of my zevedi-working group (located at the INM (Frankfurt, Hessen, Germany) as well as a citizen from Dieburg (Hessen, Germany) associated with ‘reality’ also the different kinds of emotions being active in a person and they classified an imagination about a future state also as being real in a concrete person. With such a setting of the concepts it became difficult to motivate the logic illustrated in the video. The video — based on the preceding paper — talks about a vision v, which can turn a reality r into a problem p, and thereby generating a preference Pref = (v,r). A preference can possibly become a trigger of some change process.
Before clarifying this discussion let as have a look ahead to the overall change process which constitutes the heart of the komega-software. Beginning with October 18, 2020 the idea of this overall change process has been described in this blog. Having some given situation S, the komega software allows the construction of change rules X, which can be applied onto a given situation S and a builtin simulator [sim] will generate a follow up situation S’ like sim(X,S)=S’ — or short: X(S) = S’ –, a process which can be repeated by using the output S’ as new input for a new cycle. At any time of this cyclic process one can ask whether the actual output S’ can be classified as successful. What is called ‘successful’ depends from the applied criteria. For the komega software at least two criteria are used. The most basic one looks to the ectual end state S’ of the simulation and computes the difference between the occurences of vision statements V in S’ and the occurrences of real statements R having been declared at the beginning as problems P as part of the start situation S. Ideally the real statements classified as problems should have been disappeared and the vision statements should be present. If the difference is bigger than some before agreed threshold theta than the actual end state S’ will be classified as a success, as a goal state in the light of the visions of the preferences, which triggered the change process.
In the context of the whole change process a vision statement is an expression e associated with some everyday language L and which describes in the understanding of the experts a state, which is in our mindes conceivable, imaginable, which is not given as a real state, but can eventually become a real state in some future. This disctinction presupposes that the expert can distinguish between an idea in his consciousness which is associated with some real state outside his consciousness — associated with a real state — and an idea, which is only inside his consciousness — associated with an imaginated state –. Looking from a second person to the expert this second person can observe the body of the expert and the world surrounding the body and can speak of the real world and the real body of the expert, but the inner states of the expert are hidden for this second person. Thus from the point of view of this second person there are no real imaginations, no real future states. But the expert can utter some expression e which has a meaning describing some state, which as such is not yet real, but which possibly could become real if one would change the actual reality (the actual everyday life, the actual city …) accordingly. Thus a vision statement is understood here as an expression e from the everyday language L uttered by some expert having a meaning which can be understood by the other persons describing some imginated state, which is not yet real but could eventually become real in some future ahead.
Creating problems, composing preferences
If at least one vision statement v is known by some experts, then it can happen, that an expert does relate this vision with some given reality r as part of the everyday life or with some absent reality r. Example: if an expert classifies some part of the city as having too much traffic (r1) and he has the vision of changing this into a situation where the traffic is lowered down by X% (v1), then this vision statement v1 can help to understand other experts to interpret the reality r1 in the light of the visiin v1 as a problemv1(r1) = p1. Classifying some reality r1 into a problem p1 is understood in the context of the komega software as making the reality r1 a candidate for a possible change in the sense that r1 should be replaced by v1. Having taken this stance — seeing the reality r1 as a problem p1 by the vision v1 –, than the experts have created a so-called preference Pref = (v1, p1) saying that the experts are preferring the imaginated possibly future state v1 more than the actual problem p1.
There is the special case, that an expert has uttered a vision statement v but there is no given reality which can be stated in a real statement r. Example: A company thinks that it can produce some vaccine against the disease Y in two years from now, like v2=’there is a vaccine against disease Y in yy’. Actually there exists no vaccine, but a disease is attacking the people. Because it is known, that the people can be made immune against the disease by an appropriate vaccine it makes sense to state r2=’There is no vaccine against the disease Y available’. Having the vision v2 this can turn the reality r2 into a problem p2 allowing the preference Pref=(v2,p2).
If a group of experts generated a vision v — by several and different reaons (including emotions) –, having associated this with some given eality r, and they decided to generate by v(r)=p a preference Pr =(v,p), then it can happen , that these experts decide to start a change process beginning now with the given problem p and ending up with a situation in some future where the problem p disappeared and the vision has become real.
The komega software allows the planning and testing of change processes if the acting experts have at least one preference Pref based on at least one vision statement v and at least one real statement r.
BITS OF PHILOSOPHY
The above video (in German, DE) and the following lengthy remark after the video how to understand the basic concepts vision statement [v], real statement [r], problem statement [p], as well as preference [Pref] presuppose both a certain kind of philosophy. This philosophical point of view is outlined above in a simple drawing.
Basically there is a real human person (an actor) with a real brain embedded in some everyday world. The person can perceive parts of the every day world at every point of time. The most important reference point in time is the actual moment called NOW.
Inside the brain the human person can generate some cognitive structure triggered by perception, by memory and by some thinking. Having learned some everyday language L the human person can map the cognitive structure into an expression E associated with the language L. If the cognitive structure correlates with some real situation outside the body then the meaning of the expression E is classified as being a real statement, here named E1. But the brain can generate also cognitive structures and mapping these in expressions E without being actually correlated with some real situation outside. Such a statement is here called a vision statement, here named E2. A vision statement can eventually become correlated with some real situation outside in some future. In that case the vision statement transforms into a real statement E2, while the before mentioned real statement E1 can lose its correlation with a real situation.
The analysis of the main application scenario revealed that classical
logical inference concepts are insufficient for the assistance of human ac-
tors during shared planning. It turned out that the simulator has to be
understood as a real learning artificial actor which has to gain the required
knowledge during the process.
In this section several case studies will be presented. It will be shown, how the DAAI paradigm can be applied to many different contexts . Since the original version of the DAAI-Theory in Jan 18, 2020 the concept has been further developed centering around the concept of a Collective Man-Machine Intelligence [CM:MI] to address now any kinds of experts for any kind of simulation-based development, testing and gaming. Additionally the concept now can be associated with any kind of embedded algorithmic intelligence [EAI] (different to the mainstream concept ‘artificial intelligence’). The new concept can be used with every normal language; no need for any special programming language! Go back to the overall framework.
COLLECTION OF PAPERS
There exists only a loosely order between the different papers due to the character of this elaboration process: generally this is an experimental philosophical process. HMI Analysis applied for the CM:MI paradigm.
FROM DAAI to GCA. Turning Engineering into Generative Cultural Anthropology. This paper gives an outline how one can map the DAAI paradigm directly into the GCA paradigm (April-19,2020): case1-daai-gca-v1
A first GCA open research project [GCA-OR No.1]. This paper outlines a first open research project using the GCA. This will be the framework for the first implementations (May-5, 2020): GCAOR-v0-1
Engineering and Society. A Case Study for the DAAI Paradigm – Introduction. This paper illustrates important aspects of a cultural process looking to the acting actors where certain groups of people (experts of different kinds) can realize the generation, the exploration, and the testing of dynamical models as part of a surrounding society. Engineering is clearly not separated from society (April-9, 2020): case1-population-start-part0-v1
Bootstrapping some Citizens. This paper clarifies the set of general assumptions which can and which should be presupposed for every kind of a real world dynamical model (April-4, 2020): case1-population-start-v1-1
Hybrid Simulation Game Environment [HSGE]. This paper outlines the simulation environment by combing a usual web-conference tool with an interactive web-page by our own (23.May 2020): HSGE-v2 (May-5, 2020): HSGE-v0-1
Who has followed the discussion in this blog remembers several different phases in the conceptual frameworks used here.
The first paradigm called Human-Computer Interface (HCI) has been only mentioned by historical reasons. The next phase Human-Machine Interaction (HMI) was the main paradigm in the beginning of my lecturing in 2005. Later, somewhere 2011/2012, I switched to the paradigm Actor-Actor Interaction (AAI) because I tried to generalize over the different participating machines, robots, smart interfaces, humans as well as animals. This worked quite nice and some time I thought that this is now the final formula. But reality is often different compared to our thinking. Many occasions showed up where the generalization beyond the human actor seemed to hide the real processes which are going on, especially I got the impression that very important factors rooted in the special human actor became invisible although they are playing decisive role in many processes. Another punch against the AAI view came from application scenarios during the last year when I started to deal with whole cities as actors. At the end I got the feeling that the more specialized expressions like Actor-Cognition Interaction (ACI) or Augmented Collective Intelligence (ACI) can indeed help to stress certain special properties better than the more abstract AAI acronym, but using structures like ACI within general theories and within complex computing environments it became clear that the more abstract acronym AAI is in the end more versatile and simplifies the general structures. ACI became a special sub-case
To understand this oscillation between AAI and ACI one has to look back into the history of Human Computer/ Machine Interaction, but not only until the end of the World War II, but into the more extended evolutionary history of mankind on this planet.
It is a widespread opinion under the researchers that the development of tools to help mastering material processes was one of the outstanding events which changed the path of the evolution a lot. A next step was the development of tools to support human cognition like scripture, numbers, mathematics, books, libraries etc. In this last case of cognitive tools the material of the cognitive tools was not the primary subject the processes but the cognitive contents, structures, even processes encoded by the material structures of the tools.
Only slowly mankind understood how the cognitive abilities and capabilities are rooted in the body, in the brain, and that the brain represents a rather complex biological machinery which enables a huge amount of cognitive functions, often interacting with each other; these cognitive functions show in the light of observable behavior clear limits with regard to the amount of features which can be processed in some time interval, with regard to precision, with regard to working interconnections, and more. And therefore it has been understood that the different kinds of cognitive tools are very important to support human thinking and to enforce it in some ways.
Only in the 20th century mankind was able to built a cognitive tool called computer which could show capabilities which resembled some human cognitive capabilities and which even surpassed human capabilities in some limited areas. Since then these machines have developed a lot (not by themselves but by the thinking and the engineering of humans!) and meanwhile the number and variety of capabilities where the computer seems to resemble a human person or surpasses human capabilities have extend in a way that it has become a common slang to talk about intelligent machines or smart devices.
While the original intention for the development of computers was to improve the cognitive tools with the intend to support human beings one can get today the impression as if the computer has turned into a goal on its own: the intelligent and then — as supposed — the super-intelligent computer appears now as the primary goal and mankind appears as some old relic which has to be surpassed soon.
As will be shown later in this text this vision of the computer surpassing mankind has some assumptions which are
What seems possible and what seems to be a promising roadmap into the future is a continuous step-wise enhancement of the biological structure of mankind which absorbs the modern computing technology by new cognitive interfaces which in turn presuppose new types of physical interfaces.
To give a precise definition of these new upcoming structures and functions is not yet possible, but to identify the actual driving factors as well as the exciting combinations of factors seems possible.
COGNITION EMBEDDED IN MATTER
The main idea is the shift of the focus away from the physical grounding of the interaction between actors looking instead more to the cognitive contents and processes, which shall be mediated by the physical conditions. Clearly the analysis of the physical conditions as well as the optimal design of these physical conditions is still a challenge and a task, but without a clear knowledge manifested in a clear model about the intended cognitive contents and processes one has not enough knowledge for the design of the physical layout.
SOLVING A PROBLEM
Thus the starting point of an engineering process is a group of people (the stakeholders (SH)) which identify some problem (P) in their environment and which have some minimal idea of a possible solution (S) for this problem. This can be commented by some non-functional requirements (NFRs) articulating some more general properties which shall hold through the whole solution (e.g. ‘being save’, ‘being barrier-free’, ‘being real-time’ etc.). If the description of the problem with a first intended solution including the NFRs contains at least one task (T) to be solved, minimal intended users (U) (here called executive actors (eA)), minimal intended assistive actors (aA) to assist the user in doing the task, as well as a description of the environment of the task to do, then the minimal ACI-Check can be passed and the ACI analysis process can be started.
COGNITION AND AUGMENTED COLLECTIVE INTELLIGENCE
If we talk about cognition then we think usually about cognitive processes in an individual person. But in the real world there is no cognition without an ongoing exchange between different individuals by communicative acts. Furthermore it has to be taken into account that the cognition of an individual person is in itself partitioned into two unequal parts: the unconscious part which covers about 99% of all the processes in the body and in the brain and about 1% which covers the conscious part. That an individual person can think somehow something this person has to trigger his own unconsciousness by stimuli to respond with some messages from his before unknown knowledge. Thus even an individual person alone has to organize a communication with his own unconsciousness to be able to have some conscious knowledge about its own unconscious knowledge. And because no individual person has at a certain point of time a clear knowledge of his unconscious knowledge the person even does not really know what to look for — if there is no event, not perception, no question and the like which triggers the person to interact with its unconscious knowledge (and experience) to get some messages from this unconscious machinery, which — as it seems — is working all the time.
On account of this logic of the individual internal communication with the individual cognition an external communication with the world and the manifested cognition of other persons appears as a possible enrichment in the interactions with the distributed knowledge in the different persons. While in the following approach it is assumed to represent the different knowledge responses in a common symbolic representation viewable (and hearable) from all participating persons it is growing up a possible picture of something which is generally more rich, having more facets than a picture generated by an individual person alone. Furthermore can such a procedure help all participants to synchronize their different knowledge fragments in a bigger picture and use it further on as their own picture, which in turn can trigger even more aspects out of the distributed unconscious knowledge.
If one organizes this collective triggering of distributed unconscious knowledge within a communication process not only by static symbolic models but beyond this with dynamic rules for changes, which can be interactively simulated or even played with defined states of interest then the effect of expanding the explicit and shared knowledge will be boosted even more.
From this background it makes some sense to turn the wording Actor-Cognition Interaction into the wording Augmented Collective Intelligence where Intelligence is the component of dynamic cognition in a system — here a human person –, Collective means that different individual person are sharing their unconscious knowledge by communicative interactions, and Augmented can be interpreted that one enhances, extends this sharing of knowledge by using new tools of modeling, simulation and gaming, which expands and intensifies the individual learning as well as the commonly shared opinions. For nearly all problems today this appears to be absolutely necessary.
ACI ANALYSIS PROCESS
Here it will be assumed that there exists a group of ACI experts which can supervise other actors (stakeholders, domain experts, …) in a process to analyze the problem P with the explicit goal of finding a satisfying solution (S+).
For the whole ACI analysis process an appropriate ACI software should be available to support the ACI experts as well as all the other domain experts.
In this ACI analysis process one can distinguish two main phases: (1) Construct an actor story (AS) which describes all intended states and intended changes within the actor story. (2) Make several tests of the actor story to exploit their explanatory power.
ACTOR STORY (AS)
The actor story describes all possible states (S) of the tasks (T) to be realized to reach intended goal states (S+). A mapping from one state to a follow-up state will be described by a change rule (X). Thus having start state (S0) and appropriate change rules one can construct the follow-up states from the actual state (S*) with the aid of the change rules. Formally this computation of the follow-up state (S’) will be computed by a simulator function (σ), written as: σ: S* x X —> S.
With the aid of an explicit actor story (AS) one can define the non-functional requirements (NFRs) in a way that it will become decidable whether a NFR is valid with regard to an actor story or not. In this case this test of being valid can be done as an automated verification process (AVP). Part of this test paradigm is the so-called oracle function (OF) where one can pose a question to the system and the system will answer the question with regard to all theoretically possible states without the necessity to run a (passive) simulation.
If the size of the group is large and it is important that all members of the group have a sufficient similar knowledge about the problem(s) in question (as it is the usual case in a city with different kinds of citizens) then is can be very helpful to enable interactive simulations or even games, which allow a more direct experience of the possible states and changes. Furthermore, because the participants can act according to their individual reflections and goals the process becomes highly uncertain and nearly unpredictable. Especially for these highly unpredictable processes can interactive simulations (and games) help to improve a common understanding of the involved factors and their effects. The difference between a normal interactive simulation and a game is given in the fact that a game has explicit win-states whereas the interactive simulations doesn’t. Explicit win-states can improve learning a lot.
The other interesting question is whether an actor story AS with a certain idea for an assistive actor (aA) is usable for the executive actors. This requires explicit measurements of the usability which in turn requires a clear norm of reference with which the behavior of an executive actor (eA) during a process can be compared. Usually is the actor Story as such the norm of reference with which the observable behavior of the executing actors will be compared. Thus for the measurement one needs real executive actors which represent the intended executive actors and one needs a physical realization of the intended assistive actors called mock-up. A mock-up is not yet the final implementation of the intended assistive actor but a physical entity which can show all important physical properties of the intended assistive actor in a way which allows a real test run. While in the past it has been assumed to be sufficient to test a test person only once it is here assumed that a test person has to be tested at least three times. This follows from the assumption that every executive (biological) actor is inherently a learning system. This implies that the test person will behave differently in different tests. The degree of changes can be a hint of the easiness and the learnability of the assistive actor.
If an appropriate ACI software is available then one can consider an actor story as a simple theory (ST) embracing a model (M) and a collection of rules (R) — ST(x) iff x = <M,R> –which can be used as a kind of a building block which in turn can be combined with other such building blocks resulting in a complex network of simple theories. If these simple theories are stored in a public available data base (like a library of theories) then one can built up in time a large knowledge base on their own.
Last change: 28.February 2019 (Several corrections)
An overview to the enhanced AAI theory version 2 you can find here. In this post we talk about the special topic how to proceed in a bottom-up approach.
BOTTOM-UP: THE GENERAL BLUEPRINT
As the introductory figure shows it is assumed here that there is a collection of citizens and experts which offer their individual knowledge, experiences, and skills to ‘put them on the table’ challenged by a given problem P.
This knowledge is in the beginning not structured. The first step in the direction of an actor story (AS) is to analyze the different contributions in a way which shows distinguishable elements with properties and relations. Such a set of first ‘objects’ and ‘relations’ characterizes a set of facts which define a ‘situation’ or a ‘state’ as a collection of ‘facts’. Such a situation/ state can also be understood as a first simple ‘model‘ as response to a given problem. A model is as such ‘static‘; it describes what ‘is’ at a certain point of ‘time’.
In a next step the group has to identify possible ‘changes‘ which can be associated with at least one fact. There can be many possible changes which eventually need different durations to come into effect. These effects can happen as ‘exclusive alternatives’ or in ‘parallel’. Apply the possible changes to a situation generates ‘successors’ to the actual situation. A sequence of situations generated by applied changes is usually called a ‘simulation‘.
If one allows the interaction between real actors with a simulation by associating a real actor to one of the actors ‘inside the simulation’ one is turning the simulation into an ‘interactive simulation‘ which represents basically a ‘computer game‘ (short: ‘egame‘).
One can use interactive simulations e.g. to (i) learn about the dynamics of a model, to (ii) test the assumptions of a model, to (iii) test the knowledge and skills of the real actors.
Making new experiences with a simulation allows a continuous improvement of the model and its change rules.
Additionally one can include more citizens and experts into this process and one can use available knowledge from databases and libraries.
EPISTEMOLOGY OF CONCEPTS
As outlined in the preceding section about the blueprint of a bottom-up process there will be a heavy usage of concepts to describe state of affairs.
The literature about this topic in philosophy as well as many scientific disciplines is overwhelmingly and therefore this small text here can only be a ‘pointer’ into a complex topic. Nevertheless I will use exactly this pointer to explore this topic further.
While the literature is mainly dealing with more or less specific partial models, I am trying here to point out a very general framework which fits to a more genera philosophical — especially epistemological — view as well as gives respect to many results of scientific disciplines.
The main dimensions here are (i) the outside external empirical world, which connects via sensors to the (ii) internal body, especially the brain, which works largely ‘unconscious‘, and then (iii) the ‘conscious‘ part of he brain.
The most important relationship between the ‘conscious’ and the ‘unconscious’ part of the brain is the ability of the unconscious brain to transform automatically incoming concrete sens-experiences into more ‘abstract’ structures, which have at least three sub-dimensions: (i) different concrete material, (ii) a sub-set of extracted common properties, (iii) different sets of occurring contexts associated with the different subsets. This enables the brain to extract only a ‘few’ abstract structures (= abstract concepts) to deal with ‘many’ concrete events. Thus the abstract concept ‘chair’ can cover many different concrete chairs which have only a few properties in common. Additionally the chairs can occur in different ‘contexts’ associating them with different ‘relations’ which can specify possible different ‘usages’ of the concept ‘chair’.
Thus, if the actor perceives something which ‘matches’ some ‘known’ concept then the actor is not only conscious about the empirical concrete phenomenon but also simultaneously about the abstract concept which will automatically be activated. ‘Immediately’ the actor ‘knows’ that this empirical something is e.g. a ‘chair’. Concrete: this concrete something is matching an abstract concept ‘chair’ which can as such cover many other concrete things too which can be as concrete somethings partially different from another concrete something.
From this follows an interesting side effect: while an actor can easily decide, whether a concrete something is there (“it is the case, that” = “it is true”) or not (“it is not the case, that” = “it isnot true” = “it is false”), an actor can not directly decide whether an abstract concept like ‘chair’ as such is ‘true’ in the sense, that the concept ‘as a whole’ corresponds to concrete empirical occurrences. This depends from the fact that an abstract concept like ‘chair’ can match with a nearly infinite set of possible concrete somethings which are called ‘possible instances’ of the abstract concept. But a human actor can directly ‘check’ only a ‘few’ concrete somethings. Therefore the usage of abstract concepts like ‘chair’, ‘house’, ‘bottle’ etc. implies inherently an ‘open set’ of ‘possible’ concrete exemplars and therefor is the usage of such concepts necessarily a ‘hypothetical’ usage. Because we can ‘in principle’ check the real extensions of these abstract concepts in everyday life as long there is the ‘freedom’ to do such checks, we are losing the ‘truth’ of our concepts and thereby the basis for a realistic cooperation, if this ‘freedom of checking’ is not possible.
If some incoming perception is ‘not yet known’, because nothing given in the unconsciousness does ‘match’, it is in a basic sens ‘new’ and the brain will automatically generate a ‘new concept’.
THE DIMENSION OF MEANING
In Figure 2 one can find two other components: the ‘meaning relation’ which maps concepts into ‘language expression’.
Language expressions inside the brain correspond to a diversity of visual, auditory, tactile or other empirical event sequences, which are in use for communicative acts.
These language expressions are usually not ‘isolated structures’ but are embedded in relations which map the expression structures to conceptual structures including the different substantiations of the abstract concepts and the associated contexts. By these relations the expressions are attached to the conceptual structures which are called the ‘meaning‘ of the expressions and vice versa the expressions are called the ‘language articulation’ of the meaning structures.
As far as conceptual structures are related via meaning relations to language expressions then a perception can automatically cause the ‘activation’ of the associated language expressions, which in turn can be uttered in some way. But conceptual structures can exist (especially with children) without an available meaning relation.
When language expressions are used within a communicative act then their usage can activate in all participants of the communication the ‘learned’ concepts as their intended meanings. Heaving the meaning activated in someones ‘consciousness’ this is a real phenomenon for that actor. But from the occurrence of concepts alone does not automatically follow, that a concept is ‘backed up’ by some ‘real matter’ in the external world. Someone can utter that it is raining, in the hearer of this utterance the intended concepts can become activated, but in the outside external world no rain is happening. In this case one has to state that the utterance of the language expressions “Look, its raining” has no counterpart in the real world, therefore we call the utterance in this case ‘false‘ or ‘not true‘.
THE DIMENSION OF TIME
The preceding figure 2 of the conceptual space is not yet complete. There is another important dimension based on the ability of the unconscious brain to ‘store’ certain structures in a ‘timely order’ which enables an actor — under certain conditions ! — to decide whether a certain structure X occurred in the consciousness ‘before’ or ‘after’ or ‘at the same time’ as another structure Y.
Evidently the unconscious brain is able do exactly this: (i) it can arrange the different structures under certain conditions in a ‘timely order’; (ii) it can detect ‘differences‘ between timely succeeding structures; the brain (iii) can conceptualize these changes as ‘change concepts‘ (‘rules of change’), and it can can classify different kinds of change like ‘deterministic’, ‘non-deterministic’ with different kinds of probabilities, as well as ‘arbitrary’ as in the case of ‘free learning systems‘. Free learning systems are able to behave in a ‘deterministic-like manner’, but they can also change their patterns on account of internal learning and decision processes in nearly any direction.
Based on memories of conceptual structures and derived change concepts (rules of change) the unconscious brain is able to generate different kinds of ‘possible configurations’, whose quality is depending from the degree of dependencies within the ‘generating criteria’: (i) no special restrictions; (ii) empirical restrictions; (iii) empirical restrictions for ‘upcoming states’ (if all drinkable water would be consumed, then one cannot plan any further with drinkable water).