**eJournal: uffmm.org
ISSN 2567-6458, 23.March – 24.March 2021
Email: info@uffmm.org
Author: Gerd Doeben-Henisch
Email: gerd@doeben-henisch.de**

##### CONTEXT

This text is part of a philosophy of science analysis of the case of the oksimo software (oksimo.com). A specification of the oksimo software from an engineering point of view can be found in four consecutive posts dedicated to the HMI-Analysis for this software.

##### GENERATE A VISION

As explained in the preceding post a basic idea of the oksimo behavior space is to bring together *different* *human actors*, let them *share* their knowledge and experience of *some real part of their world* and then they are invited to think about, how one can *improve this part*.

In this text we will deal with this *improvement* of a given situation S. It is assumed here that any kind of improvement needs some idea, a *vision [V]* of a * possible *real situation* S ^{fut}, *which is

*not yet real*but which in principal

*could become real*. The vision of a possible real situation can in the beginning only exist as a set of Expressions E

_{S}whose meaning is accessible by the

*meaning function φ*applied to the expression E

_{S}as φ(E

_{S}) = S

^{fut }= V. The vision V exists therefore as

*intended meaning*only. An intended but not yet real meaning appears to us as as an

*idea*in our

*mind,*which we can

*share*with other human actors by expressions classified as visions.

Such an *intended future* situation S^{fut}, the vision V, can be said to be *real* or *true* if there will be a point in time in the future where S^{fut} exists as a given real situation S about which can be said that S is *fitting as an instance* the *meaning* of the set of expressions E^{S} describing the situation S.

Le us for instance assume as a given real situation the situation S with the describing expression E_{S}= {*There is a white wooden table}.*

Le us for instance assume as a vision V the describing expression E_{V }= {*There is a black metallic table}.*

The expression E_{V} alone gives no hints whether it is describing a real situation or an intended possible future situation. This can only be decided based on *actual knowledge about the world **K ^{RW }*which enables a human actor to classify a situation S either as

*actual given*or as

*not actual given but generally possible*. Depending on such a classification of a human actor A the human actor can decide whether the expression E

_{S}= {

*There is a white wooden table}*is decidable as true or the expression E

_{V }= {

*There is a black metallic table}.*As long as the situation S is given as a real situation which corresponds to the expression E

_{S}= {

*There is a white wooden table}*then the other expression E

_{V }= {

*There is a black metallic table}*can be classified as not yet given.

##### FORMAL LOGIC BEYOND MEANING

(Last change: March 24, 2021)

Until now it has been stressed that expressions of a language L — external as well as internal – can only be understood in connection with the assumed built-in meaning function φ which enables a mapping inside a brain between different kinds of brain states NN and a subset of these brain states L_{int} which is representing the expressions of an inner language, L_{int} ⊆ NN.

Assuming this we can look to given sets of external expressions like E and E’ of the external language L nevertheless in a purely formal way. Let us assume for instance the following two sets:

E_{S} = {There is a table. The table is white. The table is quadratic.}

E_{V} = {There is a table. The table is black. The table is round. The table allows four seats.}

If we look to both sets purely formally from the point of *set theory* then we can apply set operations like the following ones:

*Cardinality*of the sets (amount of members): |E_{S}| = 3, |E_{V}| = 4*Intersection*(what is common to both): E_{S}∩ E_{V}= {There is a table}- Cardinality of the intersection: |{There is a table}| = 1
- Degree of sharing of E
_{V}to E_{S }as percentage = 1/4 = 25%_{ }

Thus purely formally without looking to the presupposed meaning we can say that the set E_{V} *representing* the *vision* does 25% of its content *share *with the set E_{S }*representing* the *actual given real situation S. *

If by some reason the actual situation S would change and thereby the corresponding set of expressions E_{S }would change one can repeat the set operations and thereby one can monitor the relationship of the given actual situation S and the vision V. If for instance a young couple wants to by a new table according to the vision E_{V} owing actual a table according to the description E_{S} than it can happen that the young couple will find different kinds of tables t_{1}, t_{2}, …, t_{n} in the furniture shops. The degree of similarity between the *wanted* table according to the vision V and the found tables t_{i} in the furniture shops can vary between at least 25% and 100%. After 6 hours of looking around with the result that the best candidate t_{i} reached only 75% it is conceivable that the young couple changes their goal from 100% fulfillment to only 75%, or not. She says: “No, I want 100%”.

##### MEANING IN THE BACKGROUND

What one can see here is that formal mechanisms can work with sets of expressions without looking to the actual meaning. But it is at the same time clear that these formal operations are only useful seen in a bigger framework where these expressions are clearly rooted in the meaning spaces of every human actor *participating in a communication* inside a *group* of human actors — experts, citizens, people … –, where the group wants to clarify the *relation* between an *actual given situation S* and *another not yet given situation S ^{fut}* which appears to the group as a

*vision*of a possible situation which — by reasons only known to this group — seems to be

*more favorable*.