Category Archives: abstract concepts

REVIEW: Keith E.Stanovich, Richard F.West, Maggie E.Toplak, “The Rational Quotient. Towards a Test of Rational Thinking”, MIT Press, 2016

(Last change: Nov 1, 2023)

CONTEXT

This text belongs to the overall theme REVIEWS.

In the last months I was engaged with the topic of text-generating algorithms and the possible impact for a scientific discourse (some first notices to this discussion you can find here (https://www.uffmm.org/2023/08/24/homo-sapiens-empirical-and-sustained-empirical-theories-emotions-and-machines-a-sketch/)). In this context it is important to clarify the role and structure of human actors as well as the concept of Intelligence. Meanwhile I have abandoned the word Intelligence completely because the inflationary use in today mainstream pulverises any meaning. Even in one discipline — like psychology — you can find many different concepts. In this context I have read the book of Stanovich et.al to have a prominent example of using the concept of intelligence, there combined with the concept of rationality, which is no less vague.

Introduction

The book “The Rationality Quotient” from 2016 represents not the beginning of a discourse but is a kind of summary of a long lasting discourse with many publications before. This makes this book interesting, but also difficult to read in the beginning, because the book is using nearly on every page theoretical terms, which are assumed to be known to the reader and cites other publications without giving sufficient explanations why exactly these cited publications are important. This is no argument against this book but sheds some light on the reader, who has to learn a lot to understand the text.

A text with the character of summing up its subject is good, because it has a confirmed meaning about the subject which enables a kind of clarity which is typical for that state of elaborated point of view.

In the following review it is not the goal to give a complete account of every detail of this book but only to present the main thesis and then to analyze the used methods and the applied epistemological framework.

Main Thesis of the Book

The reviewing starts with the basic assumptions and the main thesis.

FIGURE 1 : The beginning. Note: the number ‘2015’ has to be corrected to ‘2016’.

FIGURE 2 : First outline of cognition. Note: the number ‘2015’ has to be corrected to ‘2016’.

As mentioned in the introduction you will in the book not find a real overview about the history of psychological research dealing with the concept of Intelligence and also no overview about the historical discourse to the concept of Rationality, whereby the last concept has also a rich tradition in Philosophy. Thus, somehow you have to know it.

There are some clear warnings with regard to the fuzziness of the concept rationality (p.3) as well as to the concept of intelligence (p.15). From a point of view of Philosophy of Science it could be interesting to know what the circumstances are which are causing such a fuzziness, but this is not a topic of the book. The book talks within its own selected conceptual paradigm. Being in the dilemma, of what kind of intelligence paradigm one wants to use, the book has decided to work with the Cattell-Horn-Carroll (CTC) paradigm, which some call a theory. [1]

Directly from the beginning it is explained that the discussion of Intelligence is missing a clear explanation of the full human model of cognition (p.15) and that intelligence tests therefore are mostly measuring only parts of human cognitive functions. (p.21)

Thus let us have a more detailed look to the scenario.

[1] For a first look to the Cattell–Horn–Carroll theory see: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cattell%E2%80%93Horn%E2%80%93Carroll_theory, a first overview.

Which point of View?

The book starts with a first characterization of the concept of Rationality within a point of view which is not really clear. From different remarks one gets some hints to modern Cognitive Science (4,6), to Decision Theory (4) and Probability Calculus (9), but a clear description is missing.

And it is declared right from the beginning, that the main aim of the book is the Construction of a rational Thinking Test (4), because for the authors the used Intelligence Tests — later reduced to the Carroll-Horn-Carroll (CHC) type of intelligence test (16) — are too narrow in what they are measuring (15, 16, 21).

Related to the term Rationality the book characterizes some requirements which the term rationality should fulfill (e.g. ‘Rationality as a continuum’ (4), ’empirically based’ (4), ‘operationally grounded’ (4), a ‘strong definition’ (5), a ‘normative one’ (5), ‘normative model of optimum judgment’ (5)), but it is more or less open, what these requirements imply and what tacit assumptions have to be fulfilled, that this will work.

The two requirements ’empirically based’ as well as ‘operationally grounded’ point in the direction of an tacitly assumed concept of an empirical theory, but exactly this concept — and especially in association with the term cognitive science — isn’t really clear today.

Because the authors make in the next pages a lot of statements which claim to be serious, it seems to be important for the discussion in this review text to clarify the conditions of the ‘meaning of language expressions’ and of being classified as ‘being true’.

If we assume — tentatively — that the authors assume a scientific theory to be primarily a text whose expressions have a meaning which can transparently be associated with an empirical fact and if this is the case, then the expression will be understood as being grounded and classified as true, then we have characterized a normal text which can be used in everyday live for the communication of meanings which can become demonstrated as being true.

Is there a difference between such a ‘normal text’ and a ‘scientific theory’? And, especially here, where the context should be a scientific theory within the discipline of cognitive science: what distinguishes a normal text from a ‘scientific theory within cognitive science’?

Because the authors do not explain their conceptual framework called cognitive science we recur here to a most general characterization [2,3] which tells us, that cognitive science is not a single discipline but an interdisciplinary study which is taking from many different disciplines. It has not yet reached a state where all used methods and terms are embedded in one general coherent framework. Thus the relationship of the used conceptual frameworks is mostly fuzzy, unclear. From this follows directly, that the relationship of the different terms to each other — e.g. like ‘underlying preferences’ and ‘well ordered’ — is within such a blurred context rather unclear.

Even the simple characterization of an expression as ‘having an empirical meaning’ is unclear: what are the kinds of empirical subjects and the used terms? According to the list of involved disciplines the disciplines linguistics [4], psychology [5] or neuroscience [6] — besides others — are mentioned. But every of these disciplines is itself today a broad field of methods, not integrated, dealing with a multifaceted subject.

Using an Auxiliary Construction as a Minimal Point of Reference

Instead of becoming somehow paralyzed from these one-and-all characterizations of the individual disciplines one can try to step back and taking a look to basic assumptions about empirical perspectives.

If we take a group of Human Observers which shall investigate these subjects we could make the following assumptions:

  1. Empirical Linguistics is dealing with languages, spoken as well as written by human persons, within certain environments, and these can be observed as empirical entities.
  2. Empirical Psychology is dealing with the behavior of human persons (a kind of biological systems) within certain environments, and these can be observed.
  3. Empirical Neuroscience is dealing with the brain as part of a body which is located in some environment, and this all can be observed.

The empirical observations of certain kinds of empirical phenomena can be used to define more abstract concepts, relations, and processes. These more abstract concepts, relations, and processes have ‘as such’ no empirical meaning! They constitute a formal framework which has to become correlated with empirical facts to get some empirical meaning. As it is known from philosophy of science [7] the combination of empirical concepts within a formal framework of abstracts terms can enable ‘abstract meanings’ which by logical conclusions can produce statements which are — in the moment of stating them — not empirically true, because ‘real future’ has not yet happened. And on account of the ‘generality’ of abstract terms compared to the finiteness and concreteness of empirical facts it can happen, that the inferred statements never will become true. Therefore the mere usage of abstract terms within a text called scientific theory does not guarantee valid empirical statements.

And in general one has to state, that a coherent scientific theory including e.g. linguistics, psychology and neuroscience, is not yet in existence.

To speak of cognitive science as if this represents a clearly defined coherent discipline seems therefore to be misleading.

This raises questions about the project of a constructing a coherent rational thinking test (CART).

[2] See ‘cognitive science’ in wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cognitive_science

[3] See too ‘cognitive science’ in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cognitive-science/

[4] See ‘linguistics’ in wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linguistics

[5] See ‘psychology’ in wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Psychology

[6] See ‘neuroscience’ in wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neuroscience

[7] See ‘philosophy of science’ in wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_science

‘CART’ TEST FRAMEWORK – A Reconstruction from the point of View of Philosophy of Science

Before I will dig deeper into the theory I try to understand the intended outcome of this theory as some point of reference. The following figure 3 gives some hints.

FIGURE 3 : Outline of the Test Framework based on the Appendix in Stanovich et.al 2016. This Outline is a Reconstruction by the author of this review.

It seems to be important to distinguish at least three main parts of the whole scientific endeavor:

  1. The group of scientists which has decided to process a certain problem.
  2. The generated scientific theory as a text.
  3. The description of a CART Test, which describes a procedure, how the abstract terms of the theory can be associated with real facts.

From the group of scientists (Stanovich et al.) we know that they understand themselves as cognitive scientists (without having a clear characterization, what this means concretely).

The intended scientific theory as a text is here assumed to be realized in the book, which is here the subject of a review.

The description of a CART Test is here taken from the appendix of the book.

To understand the theory it is interesting to see, that in the real test the test system (assumed here as a human person) has to read (and hear?) a instruction, how to proceed with a task form, and then the test system (a human person) has to process the test form in the way it has understood the instructions and the test form as it is.

The result is a completed test form.

And it is then this completed test form which will be rated according to the assumed CART theory.

This complete paradigm raises a whole bunch of questions which to answer here in full is somehow out of range.

Mix-Up of Abstract Terms

Because the Test Scenario presupposes a CART theory and within this theory some kind of a model of intended test users it can be helpful to have a more closer look to this assumed CART model, which is located in a person.

FIGURE 4 : General outline of the logic behind CART according to Stanovich et al. (2016).

The presented cognitive architecture shall present a framework for the CART (Comprehensive Assessment of Rational Thinking), whereby this framework is including a model. The model is not only assumed to contextualize and classify heuristics and tasks, but it also presents Rationality in a way that one can deduce mental characteristics included in rationality.(cf. 37)

Because the term Rationality is not an individual empirical fact but an abstract term of a conceptual framework, this term has as such no meaning. The meaning of this abstract term has to be arranged by relations to other abstract terms which themselves are sufficiently related to concrete empirical statements. And these relations between abstract terms and empirical facts (represented as language expressions) have to be represented in a manner, that it is transparent how the the measured facts are related to the abstract terms.

Here Stanovich et al. is using another abstract term Mind, which is associated with characteristics called mental characteristics: Reflective mind, Algorithmic Level, and Mindware.

And then the text tells that Rationality is presenting mental characteristics. What does this mean? Is rationality different from the mind, who has some characteristics, which can be presented from rationality using somehow the mind, or is rationality nevertheless part of the mind and manifests themself in these mental characteristics? But what kind of the meaning could this be for an abstract term like rationality to be part of the mind? Without an explicit model associated with the term Mind which arranges the other abstract term Rationality within this model there exists no meaning which can be used here.

These considerations are the effect of a text, which uses different abstract terms in a way, which is rather unclear. In a scientific theory this should not be the case.

Measuring Degrees of Rationality

In the beginning of chapter 4 Stanovich et al. are looking back to chapter 1. Here they built up a chain of arguments which illustrate some general perspective (cf. 63):

  1. Rationality has degrees.
  2. These degrees of rationality can be measured.
  3. Measurement is realized by experimental methods of cognitive science.
  4. The measuring is based on the observable behavior of people.
  5. The observable behavior can manifest whether the individual actor (a human person) follows assumed preferences related to an assumed axiom of choice.
  6. Observable behavior which is classified as manifesting assumed internal preferences according to an assumed internal axiom of choice can show descriptive and procedural invariance.
  7. Based on these deduced descriptive and procedural invariance, it can be inferred further, that these actors are behaving as if they are maximizing utility.
  8. It is difficult to assess utility maximization directly.
  9. It is much easier to assess whether one of the axioms of rational choice is being violated.

These statements characterize the Logic of the CART according to Stanovich et al. (cf.64)

A major point in this argumentation is the assumption, that observable behavior is such, that one can deduce from the properties of this behavior those attributes/ properties, which point (i) to an internal model of an axiom of choice, (ii) to internal processes, which manifest the effects of this internal model, (iii) to certain characteristics of these internal processes which allow the deduction of the property of maximizing utility or not.

These are very strong assumptions.

If one takes further into account the explanations from the pages 7f about the required properties for an abstract term axiom of choice (cf. figure 1) then these assumptions appear to be very demanding.

Can it be possible to extract the necessary meaning out of observable behavior in a way, which is clear enough by empirical standards, that this behavior shows property A and not property B ?

As we know from the description of the CART in the appendix of the book (cf. figure 3) the real behavior assumed for an CART is the (i) reading (or hearing?) of an instruction communicated by ordinary English, and then (ii) a behavior deduced from the understanding of the instruction, which (iii) manifests themself in the reading of a form with a text and filling out this form in predefined positions in a required language.

This described procedure is quite common throughout psychology and similar disciplines. But it is well known, that the understanding of language instructions is very error-prone. Furthermore, the presentation of a task as a text is inevitably highly biased and additionally too very error-prone with regard to the understanding (this is a reason why in usability testing purely text-based tests are rather useless).

The point is, that the empirical basis is not given as a protocol of observations of language free behavior but of a behavior which is nearly completely embedded in the understanding and handling of texts. This points to the underlying processes of text understanding which are completely internal to the actor. There exists no prewired connection between the observable strings of signs constituting a text and the possible meaning which can be organized by the individual processes of text understanding.

Stopping Here

Having reached this point of reading and trying to understand I decided to stop here: to many questions on all levels of a scientific discourse and the relationships between main concepts and terms appear in the book of Stanovich et al. to be not clear enough. I feel therefore confirmed in my working hypothesis from the beginning, that the concept of intelligence today is far too vague, too ambiguous to contain any useful kernel of meaning any more. And concepts like Rationality, Mind (and many others) seem to do not better.

Chatting with chatGPT4

Since April 2023 I have started to check the ability of chatGPT4 to contribute to a philosophical and scientific discourse. The working hypothesis is, that chatGPT4 is good in summarizing the common concepts, which are used in public texts, but chatGPT is not able for critical evaluations, not for really new creative ideas and in no case for systematic analysis of used methods, used frameworks, their interrelations, their truth-conditons and much more, what it cannot. Nevertheless, it is a good ‘common sense check’. Until now I couldn’t learn anything new from these chats.

If you have read this review with all the details and open questions you will be perhaps a little bit disappointed about the answers from chatGPT4. But keep calm: it is a bit helpful.

Protocol with chatGPT4

ABSTRACT MORAL IN A FINITE and CHANGING WORLD

(June 20, 2023 – June 22, 2023)

(This text is a translation from the German blog of the author. The translation is supported by the deepL Software)

CONTEXT

The meaning of and adherence to moral values in the context of everyday actions has always been a source of tension, debate, and tangible conflict.

This text will briefly illuminate why this is so, and why it will probably never be different as long as we humans are the way we are.

FINITE-INFINITE WORLD

In this text it is assumed that the reality in which we ‘find’ ourselves from childhood is a ‘finite’ world. By this is meant that no phenomenon we encounter in this world – ourselves included – is ‘infinite’. In other words, all resources we encounter are ‘finite’. Even ‘solar energy’, which is considered ‘renewable’ in today’s parlance, is ‘finite’, although this finiteness outlasts the lifetimes of many generations of humans.

But this ‘finiteness’ is no contradiction to the fact that our finite world is continuously in a ‘process of change’ fed from many sides. An ‘itself-self-changing finiteness’ is with it, a something which in and in itself somehow ‘points beyond itself’! The ‘roots’ of this ‘immanent changeability’ are to a large extent perhaps still unclear, but the ‘effects’ of the ‘immanent changeability’ indicate that the respective ‘concrete finite’ is not the decisive thing; the ‘respective concrete finite’ is rather a kind of ‘indicator’ for an ‘immanent change cause’ which ‘manifests itself’ by means of concrete finites in change. The ‘forms of concrete manifestations of change’ can therefore perhaps be a kind of ‘expression’ of something that ‘works immanently behind’.

In physics there is the pair of terms ‘energy’ and ‘mass’, the latter as synonym for ‘matter’. Atomic physics and quantum mechanics have taught us that the different ‘manifestations of mass/matter’ can only be a ‘state form of energy’. The everywhere and always assumed ‘energy’ is that ‘enabling factor’, which can ‘manifest’ itself in all the known forms of matter. ‘Changing-matter’ can then be understood as a form of ‘information’ about the ‘enabling energy’.

If one sets what physics has found out so far about ‘energy’ as that form of ‘infinity’ which is accessible to us via the experiential world, then the various ‘manifestations of energy’ in diverse ‘forms of matter’ are forms of concrete finites, which, however, are ultimately not really finite in the context of infinite energy. All known material finites are only ‘transitions’ in a nearly infinite space of possible finites, which is ultimately grounded in ‘infinite energy’. Whether there is another ‘infinity’ ‘beside’ or ‘behind’ or ‘qualitatively again quite different to’ the ‘experienceable infinity’ is thus completely open.”[1]

EVERYDAY EXPERIENCES

Our normal life context is what we now call ‘everyday life’: a bundle of regular processes, often associated with characteristic behavioral roles. This includes the experience of having a ‘finite body’; that ‘processes take time in real terms’; that each process is characterized by its own ‘typical resource consumption’; that ‘all resources are finite’ (although there can be different time scales here (see the example with solar energy)).

But also here: the ’embeddedness’ of all resources and their consumption in a comprehensive variability makes ‘snapshots’ out of all data, which have their ‘truth’ not only ‘in the moment’, but in the ‘totality of the sequence’! In itself ‘small changes’ in the everyday life can, if they last, assume sizes and achieve effects which change a ‘known everyday life’ so far that long known ‘views’ and ‘long practiced behaviors’ are ‘no longer correct’ sometime: in that case the format of one’s own thinking and behavior can come into increasing contradiction with the experiential world. Then the point has come where the immanent infinity ‘manifests itself’ in the everyday finiteness and ‘demonstrates’ to us that the ‘imagined cosmos in our head’ is just not the ‘true cosmos’. In the end this immanent infinity is ‘truer’ than the ‘apparent finiteness’.

HOMO SAPIENS (WE)

Beside the life-free material processes in this finite world there are since approx. 3.5 billion years the manifestations, which we call ‘life’, and very late – quasi ‘just now’ – showed up in the billions of life forms one, which we call ‘Homo sapiens’. That is us.

The today’s knowledge of the ‘way’, which life has ‘taken’ in these 3.5 billion years, was and is only possible, because science has learned to understand the ‘seemingly finite’ as ‘snapshot’ of an ongoing process of change, which shows its ‘truth’ only in the ‘totality of the individual moments’. That we as human beings, as the ‘latecomers’ in this life-creation-process’, have the ability to ‘recognize’ successive ‘moments’ ‘individually’ as well as ‘in sequence’, is due to the special nature of the ‘brain’ in the ‘body’ and the way in which our body ‘interacts’ with the surrounding world. So, we don’t know about the ‘existence of an immanent infinity’ ‘directly’, but only ‘indirectly’ through the ‘processes in the brain’ that can identify, store, process and ‘arrange’ moments in possible sequences in a ‘neuronally programmed way’. So: our brain enables us on the basis of a given neuronal and physical structure to ‘construct’ an ‘image/model’ of a possible immanent infinity, which we assume to ‘represent’ the ‘events around us’ reasonably well.

THINKING

One characteristic attributed to Homo Sapiens is called ‘thinking’; a term which until today is described only vaguely and very variously by different sciences. From another Homo Sapiens we learn about his thinking only by his way of ‘behaving’, and a special case of it is ‘linguistic communication’.

Linguistic communication is characterized by the fact that it basically works with ‘abstract concepts’, to which as such no single object in the real world directly corresponds (‘cup’, ‘house’, ‘dog’, ‘tree’, ‘water’ etc.). Instead, the human brain assigns ‘completely automatically’ (‘unconsciously’!) most different concrete perceptions to one or the other abstract concept in such a way that a human A can agree with a human B whether one assigns this concrete phenomenon there in front to the abstract concept ‘cup’, ‘house’, ‘dog’, ‘tree’, or ‘water’. At some point in everyday life, person A knows which concrete phenomena can be meant when person B asks him whether he has a ‘cup of tea’, or whether the ‘tree’ carries apples etc.

This empirically proven ‘automatic formation’ of abstract concepts by our brain is not only based on a single moment, but these automatic construction processes work with the ‘perceptual sequences’ of finite moments ’embedded in changes’, which the brain itself also automatically ‘creates’. ‘Change as such’ is insofar not a ‘typical object’ of perception, but is the ‘result of a process’ taking place in the brain, which constructs ‘sequences of single perceptions’, and these ‘calculated sequences’ enter as ‘elements’ into the formation of ‘abstract concepts’: a ‘house’ is from this point of view not a ‘static concept’, but a concept, which can comprise many single properties, but which is ‘dynamically generated’ as a ‘concept’, so that ‘new elements’ can be added or ‘existing elements’ may be ‘taken away’ again.

MODEL: WORLD AS A PROCESS

(The words are from the German text)

Although there is no universally accepted comprehensive theory of human thought to date, there are many different models (everyday term for the more correct term ‘theories’) that attempt to approximate important aspects of human thought.

The preceding image shows the outlines of a minimally simple model to our thinking.

This model assumes that the surrounding world – with ourselves as components of that world – is to be understood as a ‘process’ in which, at a chosen ‘point in time’, one can describe in an idealized way all the ‘observable phenomena’ that are important to the observer at that point in time. This description of a ‘section of the world’ is here called ‘situation description’ at time t or simply ‘situation’ at t.

Then one needs a ‘knowledge about possible changes’ of elements of the situation description in the way (simplified): ‘If X is element of situation description at t, then for a subsequent situation at t either X is deleted or replaced by a new X*’. There may be several alternatives for deletion or replacement with different probabilities. Such ‘descriptions of changes’ are here simplified called ‘change rules’.

Additionally, as part of the model, there is a ‘game instruction’ (classically: ‘inference term’), which explains when and how to apply a change rule to a given situation Sit at t in such a way that at the subsequent time t+1, there is a situation Sit* in which the changes have been made that the change rule describes.

Normally, there is more than one change rule that can be applied simultaneously with the others. This is also part of the game instructions.

This minimal model can and must be seen against the background of continuous change.

For this structure of knowledge it is assumed that one can describe ‘situations’, possible changes of such a situation, and that one can have a concept how to apply descriptions of recognized possible changes to a given situation.

With the recognition of an immanent infinity manifested in many concrete finite situations, it is immediately clear that the set of assumed descriptions of change should correspond with the observable changes, otherwise the theory has little practical use. Likewise, of course, it is important that the assumed situation descriptions correspond with the observable world. Fulfilling the correspondence requirements or checking that they are true is anything but trivial.

ABSTRACT – REAL – INDETERMINATE

To these ‘correspondence requirements’ here some additional considerations, in which the view of the everyday perspective comes up.

It is to be noted that a ‘model’ is not the environment itself, but only a ‘symbolic description’ of a section of the environment from the point of view and with the understanding of a human ‘author’! To which properties of the environment a description refers, only the author himself knows, who ‘links’ the chosen ‘symbols’ (text or language) ‘in his head’ with certain properties of the environment, whereby these properties of the environment must also be represented ‘in the head’, quasi ‘knowledge images’ of ‘perception events’, which have been triggered by the environmental properties. These ‘knowledge images in the head’ are ‘real’ for the respective head; compared to the environment, however, they are basically only ‘fictitious’; unless there is currently a connection between current fictitious ‘images in the head’ and the ‘current perceptions’ of ‘environmental events’, which makes the ‘concrete elements of perception’ appear as ‘elements of the fictitious images’. Then the ‘fictitious’ pictures would be ‘fictitious and real’.

Due to the ‘memory’, whose ‘contents’ are more or less ‘unconscious’ in the ‘normal state’, we can however ‘remember’ that certain ‘fictitious pictures’ were once ‘fictitious and real’ in the past. This can lead to a tendency in everyday life to ascribe a ‘presumed reality’ to fictional images that were once ‘real’ in the past, even in the current present. This tendency is probably of high practical importance in everyday life. In many cases these ‘assumptions’ also work. However, this ‘spontaneous-for-real-holding’ can often be off the mark; a common source of error.

The ‘spontaneous-for-real-holding’ can be disadvantageous for many reasons. For example, the fictional images (as inescapably abstract images) may in themselves be only ‘partially appropriate’. The context of the application may have changed. In general, the environment is ‘in flux’: facts that were given yesterday may be different today.

The reasons for the persistent changes are different. Besides such changes, which we could recognize by our experience as an ‘identifiable pattern’, there are also changes, which we could not assign to a pattern yet; these can have a ‘random character’ for us. Finally there are also the different ‘forms of life’, which are basically ‘not determined’ by their system structure in spite of all ‘partial determinateness’ (one can also call this ‘immanent freedom’). The behavior of these life forms can be contrary to all other recognized patterns. Furthermore, life forms behave only partially ‘uniformly’, although everyday structures with their ‘rules of behavior’ – and many other factors – can ‘push’ life forms with their behavior into a certain direction.

If one remembers at this point again the preceding thoughts about the ‘immanent infinity’ and the view that the single, finite moments are only understandable as ‘part of a process’, whose ‘logic’ is not decoded to a large extent until today, then it is clear, that any kind of ‘modeling’ within the comprehensive change processes can only have a preliminary approximation character, especially since it is aggravated by the fact that the human actors are not only ‘passively receiving’, but at the same time always also ‘actively acting’, and thereby they influence the change process by their actions! These human influences result from the same immanent infinity as those which cause all other changes. The people (like the whole life) are thus inevitably real ‘co-creative’ …. with all the responsibilities which result from it.

MORALITY ABOVE ALL

What exactly one has to understand by ‘morality’, one has to read out of many hundreds – or even more – different texts. Every time – and even every region in this world – has developed different versions.

In this text it is assumed that with ‘moral’ such ‘views’ are meant, which should contribute to the fact that an individual person (or a group or …) in questions of the ‘decision’ of the kind “Should I rather do A or B?” should get ‘hints’, how this question can be answered ‘best’.

If one remembers at this point what was said before about that form of thinking which allows ‘prognoses’ (thinking in explicit ‘models’ or ‘theories’), then there should be an ‘evaluation’ of the ‘possible continuations’ independent of a current ‘situation description’ and independent of the possible ‘knowledge of change’. So there must be ‘besides’ the description of a situation as it ‘is’ at least a ‘second level’ (a ‘meta-level’), which can ‘talk about’ the elements of the ‘object-level’ in such a way that e.g. it can be said that an ‘element A’ from the object-level is ‘good’ or ‘bad’ or ‘neutral’ or with a certain gradual ‘tuning’ ‘good’ or ‘bad’ or ‘neutral’ at the meta-level. This can also concern several elements or whole subsets of the object level. This can be done. But for it to be ‘rationally acceptable’, these valuations would have to be linked to ‘some form of motivation’ as to ‘why’ this valuation should be accepted. Without such a ‘motivation of evaluations’ such an evaluation would appear as ‘pure arbitrariness’.

At this point the ‘air’ becomes quite ‘thin’: in the history so far no convincing model for a moral justification became known, which is in the end not dependent from the decision of humans to set certain rules as ‘valid for all’ (family, village, tribe, …). Often the justifications can still be located in the concrete ‘circumstances of life’, just as often the concrete circumstances of life ‘recede into the background’ in the course of time and instead abstract concepts are introduced, which one endows with a ‘normative power’, which elude a more concrete analysis. Rational access is then hardly possible, if at all.

In a time like in the year 2023, in which the available knowledge is sufficient to be able to recognize the interdependencies of literally everybody from everybody, in addition the change dynamics, which can threaten with the components ‘global warming’ the ‘sustainable existence of life on earth’ substantially, ‘abstractly set normative terms’ appear not only ‘out of time’, no, they are highly dangerous, since they can substantially hinder the preservation of life in the further future.

META-MORAL (Philosophy)

The question then arises whether this ‘rational black hole’ of ‘justification-free normative concepts’ marks the end of human thinking or whether thinking should instead just begin here?

Traditionally, ‘philosophy’ understands itself as that attitude of thinking, in which every ‘given’ – including any kind of normative concepts – can be made an ‘object of thinking’. And just the philosophical thinking has produced exactly this result in millennia of struggle: there is no point in thinking, from which all ought/all evaluating can be derived ‘just like that’.

In the space of philosophical thinking, on the meta-moral level, it is possible to ‘thematize’ more and more aspects of our situation as ‘mankind’ in a dynamic environment (with man himself as part of this environment), to ‘name’ them, to place them in a ‘potential relations’, to make ‘thinking experiments’ about ‘possible developments’, but this philosophical meta-moral knowledge is completely transparent and always identifiable. The inferences about why something seems ‘better’ than something else are always ’embedded’, ‘related’. The demands for an ‘autonomous morality’, for an ‘absolute morality’ besides philosophical thinking appear ‘groundless’, ‘arbitrary’, ‘alien’ to the ‘matter’ against this background. A rational justification is not possible.

A ‘rationally unknowable’ may exist, exists even inescapably, but this rationally unknowable is our sheer existence, the actual real occurrence, for which so far there is no rational ‘explanation’, more precisely: not yet. But this is not a ‘free pass’ for irrationality. In ‘irrationality’ everything disappears, even the ‘rationally unrecognizable’, and this belongs to the most important ‘facts’ in the world of life.

COMMENTS

[1] The different forms of ‘infinity’, which have been introduced into mathematics with the works of Georg Cantor and have been intensively further investigated, have nothing to do with the experienceable finiteness/ infinity described in the text: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georg_Cantor . However, if one wants to ‘describe’ the ‘experience’ of real finiteness/ infinity, then one will possibly want to fall back on descriptive means of mathematics. But it is not a foregone conclusion whether the mathematical concepts ‘harmonize’ with the empirical experience standing to the matter.