Category Archives: philosopher

WHAT IS LIFE? … PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE

A localization of philosophy within the overall context:

Author: Gerd Doeben-Henisch

Changelog: Jan 21, 2025 – Jan 28, 20225

AUTHOR: I have changed the title “WHAT IS LIFE? … PHILOSOPHY OF THE WORLD” to “WHAT IS LIFE? … PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE.” Reason: It will become evident in the course of the investigation that the ‘life’ we find on planet Earth, and which at first glance appears to be a ‘part of the world and the universe,’ may not actually be only a ‘part’ … Therefore a ‘philosophy’ aiming to describe the ‘world’ would do better to focus directly on ‘life,’ which is the true ‘riddle of the universe.’

Email: info@uffmm.org

TRANSLATION: The following text is a translation from a German version into English. For the translation I am using the software @chatGPT4o with manual modifications.

CONTENT TREE

This text is part of the TOPIC Philosophy of Science.

CONTEXT


This is a direct continuation of the preceding texts “WHAT IS LIFE? WHAT ROLE DO WE PLAY? IST THERE A FUTURE?” and “WHAT IS LIFE? … DEMOCRACY – CITIZENS”

INTRODUCTION

In the two preceding texts, the ‘framework’ was outlined within which the subsequent texts on the topic “What is life? What roles do we have? Is there a future?” will unfold.

The exploration of the various aspects of this broad theme begins with reflections on the role of ‘philosophy’ in this context.

ANCHORING ‘PHILOSOPHY’ IN LIFE

The assumption here is that the phenomenon of ‘philosophy’ is connected to ‘actors’ who live on this ‘planet,’ who are part of the great phenomenon of ‘life’ on this planet. According to a widely held understanding, philosophy is found primarily in the life form broadly referred to as ‘Homo’ (approximately 6 million years before our present time) and, within the Homo lineage, later manifested as ‘Homo sapiens’ (approximately 300,000 years before our present time). While other manifestations of the Homo life form existed alongside Homo sapiens, it is only Homo sapiens who have survived to this day—so essentially, ‘us.’

As is well known, in the year 2025, there are many ‘continents’ on the planet Earth where ‘humans’ live almost everywhere. The ways people live on different continents often differ significantly in outward appearances, influenced by external conditions (climate, vegetation, geology, worldviews, etc.). The ‘genetic basis’ is either almost ‘identical’ or differs only in ‘details.’ The connection between these details and observable ‘behavior’ remains largely unclear. While differences in hair color, skin color, body shape, etc., may exist, these differences are found on every continent, in every population group, and are irrelevant to behavior.

Due to numerous ‘necessities of life’ (food, drink, shelter, etc.), humans never act entirely ‘planlessly.’ From the earliest ‘evidence of human life,’ we can observe that humans ‘shape,’ ‘organize,’ and develop their behavior and environment into increasingly complex ‘systems of rules’ that guide their actions. The entirety of these forms, organizations, and systems of rules is referred to here as ‘culture.’

Within this ‘human culture,’ one feature stands out in particular: communication through ‘spoken language.’ While humans can ‘communicate’ in many ways without explicit speech, for all detailed, complex matters—especially for the purpose of ‘coordinating shared actions’—spoken language proves to be indispensable and immensely powerful! It is noteworthy that there was not just ‘one language,’ but almost as many languages as there were ‘human communities.’ The ‘harmonization of languages’ or the ‘fusion’ of different languages has—if at all—only occurred over many generations. Even today (2025), we see national communities with hundreds of languages coexisting, and it seems self-evident that at multinational events, each nation participates with at least one ‘own’ language.

As a culture becomes enriched with more and more ‘elements,’ the demands on the ‘members of this culture’ to ‘familiarize themselves’ with all these elements and their ‘interplay’ increase. Today, we would say that individual members must ‘learn’ their own culture.

In the last approximately 2,000 to 3,000 years of human culture, a ‘pattern of education’ has emerged that is broadly referred to as ‘philosophy,’ or specific behaviors are labeled as ‘philosophical.’ The diversity of this phenomenon ‘philosophy’ is so vast and pronounced that it seems nearly impossible to trace this diversity back to just a few fundamental elements. Those who wish to explore this historical diversity further can do so by consulting relevant handbooks and encyclopedias, where they may—possibly—’lose themselves’ in this diversity.

Here, a different approach is taken.

This ‘diversity of the philosophical’ ultimately always leads back to specific individuals—usually referred to as ‘philosophers’ in an educational sense—who were actors in a particular, culturally shaped ‘everyday life.’ As ‘parts’ of such a ‘life process,’ they formed certain ‘opinions,’ ‘views of life.’ They used ‘specific linguistic expressions,’ interpreted, classified, and organized the experienced life through their linguistic expressions, and abstracted from individual phenomena. They ‘perceived relationships’ between phenomena, summarized many relationships into ‘networks of relationships’ (often also called ‘models’ or ‘theories’), and studied the ‘functioning of language’ (rather late), the ‘functioning of thought,’ and much more.

‘In the end,’ all these linguistic and intellectual activities led to various philosophers developing different ‘views of everyday life and the world.’ Some ‘later’ philosophers considered such ‘philosophical views’ of ‘earlier’ philosophers for their own ‘production of views,’ but to this day, one cannot claim that there is ‘one grand philosophical view of the world.’ Instead, we find a vast number of fragments and drafts, specific perspectives, some contradictory, with little overlap.

It is striking that there is still no (!) philosophical view of the world that explains philosophy ‘itself,’ its own ’emergence,’ its own ‘functioning.’ There are many reasons why this is so. Even for a philosopher willing to scrutinize all the ‘assumptions of their thinking,’ obstacles exist. One such obstacle is the language within which they philosophize. Philosophizing in a particular language while simultaneously reflecting on the ‘assumptions of that language’ is maximally difficult, and no one has truly succeeded in doing so. To a certain extent, the same applies to their own body, within which the philosopher finds themselves. The complex inner workings of one’s own body are—roughly estimated—accessible to no more than about 1% of any person. Another significant obstacle is the entirety of the culture in a society. Over a lifetime, this culture leaves deep marks on a philosopher’s ‘feelings, thinking, and behavior,’ which can only be questioned and changed to a very limited extent. Finally, not to be overlooked, is the phenomenon of ‘time,’ manifesting as ‘changes’ in the experienced everyday life and in the evolving ‘inner life’ of a philosopher: What was just ‘present’ suddenly becomes ‘past’; what was just ‘blue’ suddenly turns ‘black.’ Everything can change. And what does a philosopher then do with their ‘memories,’ shaped by ‘yesterday’?

This reflection on some of the ‘conditions of a philosopher’s cognition’ may seem ‘depressing,’ extinguishing any ‘hope for useful insight’ at the outset. However, everyday life teaches us that we humans are still here, that even in the ‘scientific field of philosophy,’ there seems to be a kind of ‘development of views (models, theories)’ which give the impression of ‘functioning,’ enabling us to make ‘predictions’ to a limited extent that can be ‘verified as accurate.’

For the further determination of what characterizes the phenomenon of ‘philosophy,’ the focus here will be less on the ‘congealed form’ of philosophy as an educational construct but more on the ‘everyday processes’ where specific people engage in concrete activities that form the ‘framework’ or ‘medium’ within which ‘philosophy for all’ takes place.

Ultimately, ‘philosophy’ is a ‘holistic phenomenon’ that becomes visible in the interplay of many people in an everyday context, is experienced, and can only take shape in this process form. ‘Truth,’ as the ‘core’ of any reality-related thinking, is always only found as a ‘part’ of a process in which the interconnected dynamics are essential to the ‘truth of a matter.’ Therefore, truth is never ‘self-evident,’ never ‘simple,’ never ‘free.’ Truth is a ‘precious substance’ that requires every effort to ‘attain’ and whose state is ‘fleeting,’ as the ‘world’ within which truth can be ‘worked out’ continuously changes as a world. A key factor in this constant change is life itself: the ‘existence of life’ is only possible within an ‘ongoing process’ through which ‘energy’ can illuminate ’emergent images’—not created for ‘resting’ but for ‘becoming,’ whose ultimate goal still appears in many ways ‘open.’ Life can indeed—partially—destroy itself or—partially—empower itself. Somewhere in the midst of all this, we find ourselves. The current year ‘2025’ is actually of little significance for this.

… To be continued …

OKSIMO MEETS POPPER. Popper’s Position

eJournal: uffmm.org
ISSN 2567-6458, 31.March – 31.March  2021
Email: info@uffmm.org
Author: Gerd Doeben-Henisch
Email: gerd@doeben-henisch.de

CONTEXT

This text is part of a philosophy of science  analysis of the case of the oksimo software (oksimo.com). A specification of the oksimo software from an engineering point of view can be found in four consecutive  posts dedicated to the HMI-Analysis for  this software.

POPPERs POSITION IN THE CHAPTERS 1-17

In my reading of the chapters 1-17 of Popper’s The Logic of Scientific Discovery [1] I see the following three main concepts which are interrelated: (i) the concept of a scientific theory, (ii) the point of view of a meta-theory about scientific theories, and (iii) possible empirical interpretations of scientific theories.

Scientific Theory

A scientific theory is according to Popper a collection of universal statements AX, accompanied by a concept of logical inference , which allows the deduction of a certain theorem t  if one makes  some additional concrete assumptions H.

Example: Theory T1 = <AX1,>

AX1= {Birds can fly}

H1= {Peter is  a bird}

: Peter can fly

Because  there exists a concrete object which is classified as a bird and this concrete bird with the name ‘Peter’ can  fly one can infer that the universal statement could be verified by this concrete bird. But the question remains open whether all observable concrete objects classifiable as birds can fly.

One could continue with observations of several hundreds of concrete birds but according to Popper this would not prove the theory T1 completely true. Such a procedure can only support a numerical universality understood as a conjunction of finitely many observations about concrete birds   like ‘Peter can fly’ & ‘Mary can fly’ & …. &’AH2 can fly’.(cf. p.62)

The only procedure which is applicable to a universal theory according to Popper is to falsify a theory by only one observation like ‘Doxy is a bird’ and ‘Doxy cannot fly’. Then one could construct the following inference:

AX1= {Birds can fly}

H2= {Doxy is  a bird, Doxy cannot fly}

: ‘Doxy can fly’ & ~’Doxy can fly’

If a statement A can be inferred and simultaneously the negation ~A then this is called a logical contradiction:

{AX1, H2}  ‘Doxy can fly’ & ~’Doxy can fly’

In this case the set {AX1, H2} is called inconsistent.

If a set of statements is classified as inconsistent then you can derive from this set everything. In this case you cannot any more distinguish between true or false statements.

Thus while the increase of the number of confirmed observations can only increase the trust in the axioms of a scientific theory T without enabling an absolute proof  a falsification of a theory T can destroy the ability  of this  theory to distinguish between true and false statements.

Another idea associated with this structure of a scientific theory is that the universal statements using universal concepts are strictly speaking speculative ideas which deserve some faith that these concepts will be provable every time one will try  it.(cf. p.33, 63)

Meta Theory, Logic of Scientific Discovery, Philosophy of Science

Talking about scientific theories has at least two aspects: scientific theories as objects and those who talk about these objects.

Those who talk about are usually Philosophers of Science which are only a special kind of Philosophers, e.g. a person  like Popper.

Reading the text of Popper one can identify the following elements which seem to be important to describe scientific theories in a more broader framework:

A scientific theory from a point of  view of Philosophy of Science represents a structure like the following one (minimal version):

MT=<S, A[μ], E, L, AX, , ET, E+, E-, true, false, contradiction, inconsistent>

In a shared empirical situation S there are some human actors A as experts producing expressions E of some language L.  Based on their built-in adaptive meaning function μ the human actors A can relate  properties of the situation S with expressions E of L.  Those expressions E which are considered to be observable and classified to be true are called true expressions E+, others are called false expressions  E-. Both sets of expressions are true subsets of E: E+ ⊂ E  and E- ⊂ E. Additionally the experts can define some special  set of expressions called axioms  AX which are universal statements which allow the logical derivation of expressions called theorems of the theory T  ET which are called logically true. If one combines the set of axioms AX with some set of empirically true expressions E+ as {AX, E+} then one can logically derive either  only expressions which are logically true and as well empirically true, or one can derive logically true expressions which are empirically true and empirically false at the same time, see the example from the paragraph before:

{AX1, H2}  ‘Doxy can fly’ & ~’Doxy can fly’

Such a case of a logically derived contradiction A and ~A tells about the set of axioms AX unified with the empirical true expressions  that this unified set  confronted with the known true empirical expressions is becoming inconsistent: the axioms AX unified with true empirical expressions  can not  distinguish between true and false expressions.

Popper gives some general requirements for the axioms of a theory (cf. p.71):

  1. Axioms must be free from contradiction.
  2. The axioms  must be independent , i.e . they must not contain any axiom deducible from the remaining axioms.
  3. The axioms should be sufficient for the deduction of all statements belonging to the theory which is to be axiomatized.

While the requirements (1) and (2) are purely logical and can be proved directly is the requirement (3) different: to know whether the theory covers all statements which are intended by the experts as the subject area is presupposing that all aspects of an empirical environment are already know. In the case of true empirical theories this seems not to be plausible. Rather we have to assume an open process which generates some hypothetical universal expressions which ideally will not be falsified but if so, then the theory has to be adapted to the new insights.

Empirical Interpretation(s)

Popper assumes that the universal statements  of scientific theories   are linguistic representations, and this means  they are systems of signs or symbols. (cf. p.60) Expressions as such have no meaning.  Meaning comes into play only if the human actors are using their built-in meaning function and set up a coordinated meaning function which allows all participating experts to map properties of the empirical situation S into the used expressions as E+ (expressions classified as being actually true),  or E- (expressions classified as being actually false) or AX (expressions having an abstract meaning space which can become true or false depending from the activated meaning function).

Examples:

  1. Two human actors in a situation S agree about the  fact, that there is ‘something’ which  they classify as a ‘bird’. Thus someone could say ‘There is something which is a bird’ or ‘There is  some bird’ or ‘There is a bird’. If there are two somethings which are ‘understood’ as being a bird then they could say ‘There are two birds’ or ‘There is a blue bird’ (If the one has the color ‘blue’) and ‘There is a red bird’ or ‘There are two birds. The one is blue and the other is red’. This shows that human actors can relate their ‘concrete perceptions’ with more abstract  concepts and can map these concepts into expressions. According to Popper in this way ‘bottom-up’ only numerical universal concepts can be constructed. But logically there are only two cases: concrete (one) or abstract (more than one).  To say that there is a ‘something’ or to say there is a ‘bird’ establishes a general concept which is independent from the number of its possible instances.
  2. These concrete somethings each classified as a ‘bird’ can ‘move’ from one position to another by ‘walking’ or by ‘flying’. While ‘walking’ they are changing the position connected to the ‘ground’ while during ‘flying’ they ‘go up in the air’.  If a human actor throws a stone up in the air the stone will come back to the ground. A bird which is going up in the air can stay there and move around in the air for a long while. Thus ‘flying’ is different to ‘throwing something’ up in the air.
  3. The  expression ‘A bird can fly’ understood as an expression which can be connected to the daily experience of bird-objects moving around in the air can be empirically interpreted, but only if there exists such a mapping called meaning function. Without a meaning function the expression ‘A bird can fly’ has no meaning as such.
  4. To use other expressions like ‘X can fly’ or ‘A bird can Y’ or ‘Y(X)’  they have the same fate: without a meaning function they have no meaning, but associated with a meaning function they can be interpreted. For instance saying the the form of the expression ‘Y(X)’ shall be interpreted as ‘Predicate(Object)’ and that a possible ‘instance’ for a predicate could be ‘Can Fly’ and for an object ‘a bird’ then we could get ‘Can Fly(a Bird)’ translated as ‘The object ‘a Bird’ has the property ‘can fly” or shortly ‘A Bird can fly’. This usually would be used as a possible candidate for the daily meaning function which relates this expression to those somethings which can move up in the air.
Axioms and Empirical Interpretations

The basic idea with a system of axioms AX is — according to Popper —  that the axioms as universal expressions represent  a system of equations where  the  general terms   should be able to be substituted by certain values. The set of admissible values is different from the set of  inadmissible values. The relation between those values which can be substituted for the terms  is called satisfaction: the values satisfy the terms with regard to the relations! And Popper introduces the term ‘model‘ for that set of admissible terms which can satisfy the equations.(cf. p.72f)

But Popper has difficulties with an axiomatic system interpreted as a system of equations  since it cannot be refuted by the falsification of its consequences ; for these too must be analytic.(cf. p.73) His main problem with axioms is,  that “the concepts which are to be used in the axiomatic system should be universal names, which cannot be defined by empirical indications, pointing, etc . They can be defined if at all only explicitly, with the help of other universal names; otherwise they can only be left undefined. That some universal names should remain undefined is therefore quite unavoidable; and herein lies the difficulty…” (p.74)

On the other hand Popper knows that “…it is usually possible for the primitive concepts of an axiomatic system such as geometry to be correlated with, or interpreted by, the concepts of another system , e.g . physics …. In such cases it may be possible to define the fundamental concepts of the new system with the help of concepts which were originally used in some of the old systems .”(p.75)

But the translation of the expressions of one system (geometry) in the expressions of another system (physics) does not necessarily solve his problem of the non-empirical character of universal terms. Especially physics is using also universal or abstract terms which as such have no meaning. To verify or falsify physical theories one has to show how the abstract terms of physics can be related to observable matters which can be decided to be true or not.

Thus the argument goes back to the primary problem of Popper that universal names cannot not be directly be interpreted in an empirically decidable way.

As the preceding examples (1) – (4) do show for human actors it is no principal problem to relate any kind of abstract expressions to some concrete real matters. The solution to the problem is given by the fact that expressions E  of some language L never will be used in isolation! The usage of expressions is always connected to human actors using expressions as part of a language L which consists  together with the set of possible expressions E also with the built-in meaning function μ which can map expressions into internal structures IS which are related to perceptions of the surrounding empirical situation S. Although these internal structures are processed internally in highly complex manners and  are — as we know today — no 1-to-1 mappings of the surrounding empirical situation S, they are related to S and therefore every kind of expressions — even those with so-called abstract or universal concepts — can be mapped into something real if the human actors agree about such mappings!

Example:

Lets us have a look to another  example.

If we take the system of axioms AX as the following schema:  AX= {a+b=c}. This schema as such has no clear meaning. But if the experts interpret it as an operation ‘+’ with some arguments as part of a math theory then one can construct a simple (partial) model m  as follows: m={<1,2,3>, <2,3,5>}. The values are again given as  a set of symbols which as such must not ave a meaning but in common usage they will be interpreted as sets of numbers   which can satisfy the general concept of the equation.  In this secondary interpretation m is becoming  a logically true (partial) model for the axiom Ax, whose empirical meaning is still unclear.

It is conceivable that one is using this formalism to describe empirical facts like the description of a group of humans collecting some objects. Different people are bringing  objects; the individual contributions will be  reported on a sheet of paper and at the same time they put their objects in some box. Sometimes someone is looking to the box and he will count the objects of the box. If it has been noted that A brought 1 egg and B brought 2 eggs then there should according to the theory be 3 eggs in the box. But perhaps only 2 could be found. Then there would be a difference between the logically derived forecast of the theory 1+2 = 3  and the empirically measured value 1+2 = 2. If one would  define all examples of measurement a+b=c’ as contradiction in that case where we assume a+b=c as theoretically given and c’ ≠ c, then we would have with  ‘1+2 = 3′ & ~’1+2 = 3’ a logically derived contradiction which leads to the inconsistency of the assumed system. But in reality the usual reaction of the counting person would not be to declare the system inconsistent but rather to suggest that some unknown actor has taken against the agreed rules one egg from the box. To prove his suggestion he had to find this unknown actor and to show that he has taken the egg … perhaps not a simple task … But what will the next authority do: will the authority belief  the suggestion of the counting person or will the authority blame the counter that eventually he himself has taken the missing egg? But would this make sense? Why should the counter write the notes how many eggs have been delivered to make a difference visible? …

Thus to interpret some abstract expression with regard to some observable reality is not a principal problem, but it can eventually be unsolvable by purely practical reasons, leaving questions of empirical soundness open.

SOURCES

[1] Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, First published 1935 in German as Logik der Forschung, then 1959 in English by  Basic Books, New York (more editions have been published  later; I am using the eBook version of Routledge (2002))