

Review of MASLOW (1966)
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SCIENCE
A Reconnaissance
Part II: Discussion of Maslow's Position
A Review from the Point of View of the GCA Paradigm
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Gerd Doeben-Henisch
doeben@fb2.fra-uas.de
Frankfurt University of Applied Sciences
Nibelungenplatz 1
D-60318 Frankfurt am Main

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Abstract

In this review I discuss the ideas of the book *The Psychology of Science* (1966) from A.Maslow[Mas66]. His book is in a certain sense *out-standing* because the point of view is in one respect inspired by an artificial borderline between the *mainstream-view of empirical science* and the *mainstream-view of psychotherapy*. In another respect the book discusses a possible *integrated view of empirical science with psychotherapy* as an integral part. The point of view of the reviewer is the new paradigm of a *Generative Cultural Anthropology[GCA]*¹. Part II of this review reports some considerations reflecting the relationship of the point of view of Maslow and the point of view of GCA.

1 The GCA Point of View

Although at the moment of writing these lines of text there exists not yet a completely specified GCA theory, the starting point, a certain version of the *Distributed Actor-Actor Interaction [DAAI]* Theory² is given, and the re-

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¹See the different posts on this website <https://www.uffmm.org/2020/04/02/case-studies/>

²See <https://www.uffmm.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/aaicourse-15-06-07.pdf>, chapter 8

interpretation of the DAAI theory as a *Generative Cultural Anthropology [GCA]* theory is straightforward.³

2 Possible Dimensions of a Discourse

For a comparison of Maslow's point of view and the GCA point of view one can take several different perspectives as point of view for the discussion. Here are some of them:

1. The concept of a scientific theory.
2. The possible domains of a scientific theory.
3. The role of scientific theory within a society.
4. The interaction between a scientific theory and its actors.
5. The society, its actors, and the possible future in the light of a scientific theory.
6. The fulfillment of philosophy.

3 A Scientific Theory

Not really finished ...: One can be tempted to assume that the *concept of an empirical theory* is the most used concept today and therefore it is also the most clarified one. But it isn't. Since the beginnings of the idea of modern empirical theory somehow in the times of Galileo Galilei (1564 - 1642) we encounter many different practices and interpretations in the following centuries all claiming to be instances of modern empirical theory.⁴ In this discussion we will focus on that view of empirical science which is associated with the idea of a *General cultural anthropology [GCA]*. Additionally we will restrict the discussion to the direct relations between Maslow's view of empirical science and the GCA view.

Things are a bit more complicated because Maslow himself is using a basic distinction between what he calls *orthodox empirical science [OE]* and *interpersonal empirical science [IE]*. Thus we will compare these two concepts with the GCA concept.

³See <https://www.uffmm.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/case1-daaigca-v1.pdf> as well as <https://www.uffmm.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/GCAOR-v0-1.pdf>

⁴As an example of the fuzzy view of modern science see e.g. the lengthy wikipedia post here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scientific_method. The general view is 'broad', but if you are looking to the details you will find many unsolved questions.

3.1 Basis of an Empirical Theory

If you are looking to the *Basis* of an empirical theory then you will encounter just in the beginning a great difference between different positions.

OE: In *orthodox* science one assumes that one is observing *real facts* in the *real world* which can be *measured* with some *real measurement procedures* which are *repeatable* and will reproduce the *same results independent* of the human person who is doing the measurement. These formulations abstract away from the various concrete circumstances which have to be *the same* that a measurement will yield the same results.

IE: In the *interpersonal* science paradigm proposed by Maslow he claims to take into account the *subjective* experience of a person-object too, which induces according to Maslow the further necessity, that the observer has to include his own subjective experience too, otherwise he cannot understand the data of a person-object.

GCA: In the *generative cultural anthropology* science it is right from the beginning assumed that there are objects in the domain of investigation which show an observable behavior which can only be explained by assuming *complex internal states*, which therefore have to be *included in the domain of empirical science*. In GCA exists the further assumption that *all kinds of person objects* – and observers and scientists are also person-objects – can only communicate, cooperate because they have internal states which are responsible for there way of *understanding* and *acting*. Therefore it is never enough to observe only the observable external behavior but one has to include *sufficiently rich models* to explain the *inner states* which are *necessary conditions* for this external behavior. Furthermore uses the GCA science the results of empirical sciences about the inner states of biological systems, especially human persons, which show clearly that the so-called *world view* of a person (and an observer) is bound to the brain of a body, and this brain is completely *disconnected* from the *external/ outside* world of orthodox empirical science. Thus the brain is continuously computing a *model of the outside world* completely based on *internal signals from the inner states of the body*. Therefore that property which *everyday experience* as well as *Philosophy* is calling *consciousness* is a property of internal states and the *content of the consciousness* – often called *phenomena [Ph]* – is again only an internal state. In this framework every *primary experience* is completely *subjective*. The so-called *empirical/ objective* experience is in this framework a true subset of this subjective experience based on the criterion that a certain subjective experience of a tree standing 'before me' can be *shared* by

some other person and the *agreement* between *different persons* can tell, that a certain subjective experience seems to be rooted in *some realm between different subjective experiences*; this *realm between* different subjective experiences is a *derived* secondary property based the primary subjective experience. Insofar every person learns during his life – needing many years – that it has a *body* and that this body and parts of this body are *like objects in the objective world* one can – without the explicit help of another person – in many everyday situations conclude by oneself – based on the acquired knowledge during learning – that there is something beyond the primary experience in the objective world too.

Although Maslow has overcome the limits of the orthodox science basis of experience he did not built an explicit conceptual framework for this. But his point is clear.

The GCA-point of view is the result of different philosophical and methodological considerations which show that the point of *primary experience* is not something which you can get in a simple, straightforward way. The reason is the *architecture of biological knowledge*, which is the result of 3.5 billion years of development. This knowledge is designed to give the bearer of knowledge – the individual biological system – a fast and immediate picture of his surrounding world including the bearer. This works fine – as everybody can experience – but the machinery enabling this result is far from being trivial; using the fantastic output of this biologically engineered high-end machine called brain as basis of *science* requires that science takes this machinery and the manner how it works into account and clarifies how these biological conditions influence the basic experience. And because the orthodox science methods are too limited to clarify this point sufficiently well one has to use additional philosophical considerations because philosophy is the only discipline which does not exclude any kind of experience. This is the reason why every special discipline needs philosophy as primary conceptual framework; otherwise the conceptual frameworks will inevitably be incomplete; this is an example of ir-rationalism which is today widely spread in modern science. In the historically motivated defense of true experience science has encapsulated itself into a new, modern form of irrationalism, which in the end can lead even to a new kind of dogmatism.

To be continued ...

References

[Mas66] Abraham H. Maslow. *The Psychology of Science. A Reconnaissance*. Harper & Row, New York – London, 1966.