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# ACTOR ACTOR INTER- ACTION [AAI]

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*Dedicated to those who gave us the prior  
experience and the inspiring ideas to develop  
the view offered in this book..*



# Preface

*An AAI Course Program:* Within a larger book project about the AAI paradigm represents this text a short, condensed version of the AAI analysis which can be handled within the summer term of a master program. While the larger book project tries to bring together such diverse topics as *Human-Machine Interaction (HMI)*, *Systems Engineering (SE)*, *Artificial Intelligence (AI)*, *Cognitive Science (CogS)* and *Philosophy of Science (PhS)* in one coherent framework called *Actor-Actor Interaction (AAI)*, this shorter text is intended to introduce to a minimal program starting with a problem, analyze the problem in an AAI manner, test the result and stop.

*Overview* The course follows two main topics: (i) providing the necessary *theory* (ii) to enable a real *analysis process*.

*Web Site* This small text is located as one sub-topic at the main website <https://www.uffmm.org/>.

*Terminology: HMI - AAI - ACI/ ACI* In the above mentioned online book the history of the terminology like HCI, HMI, AAI etc. is discussed. In this text – a one-semester course program – the perspective of *Actor-Actor Interaction (AAI)* will be the dominant perspective. But the reader should know that the labeling of *Actor-Cognition Interaction (ACI)* is also valid by pointing to *cognition* as the main factor within the interaction paradigm of actors. One can even go further by emphasizing the dimension of the *distributedness of knowledge* in the different brains of the individual members of a population which can only be *shared and synchronized* by a sufficient *communication*. While the usual communication is the basis for all sharing, new methods of *shared symbolic modeling*, *interactive simulations* or even *common gaming* can improve this sharing remarkably. These new methods can be understood as an *augmentation* of the classical methods of communication. Thus the acronym *ACI* can have another, more specific meaning.



**Part I**

**Theory**



# 1

## Introduction

THE TERM 'ACTOR-ACTOR INTERACTION (AAI)' as used in the title of the book is not yet very common. Better known is the term 'HMI' (Human-Machine Interaction) which again points back to the term 'HCI' (Human-Computer Interaction). Looking to the course of events between 1945 and about 2000 one can observe a steady development of the hardware and the software in many directions.<sup>1</sup>

One can observe an explosion of new applications and usages of computer. This caused a continuous challenge of how human persons can interact with this new technology which has been called in the beginning 'Human Computer Interaction (HCI)'. But with the extension of the applications in nearly all areas of daily life from workplace, factory, to education, health, arts and much more the interaction was no longer restricted to the 'traditional' computer but interaction happened with all kinds of devices which internally or in the background used computer hardware and software. Thus a 'normal' room, a 'normal' street, a 'normal' building, a toy, some furniture, cars, and much more turned into a computerized device with sensors and actuators. At the same time the collaborators of human persons altered to 'intelligent' machines, robots, and smart interfaces. Thus to speak of a 'human user' interacting with a 'technical interface' seems no longer to be appropriate. A more appropriate language game is the new talk of 'interacting actors', which can be sets of different groups of actors interacting in an environment to fulfill a task. Actors are then today biological systems (humans as well as animals) and non-biological systems. Therefore I decided to talk instead of Human-Machine Interaction (HMI) now of 'Actor-Actor Interaction (AAI)'.

THE BASIC IDEA OF THE AAI PARADIGM IN THIS BOOK is still centered around a 'concrete interface ( $A_{Intf.Real}$ )' which allows 'real interaction' with 'real actors ( $A_{Real}$ )', and these real interfaces have been 'tested' before their usage 'sufficiently well'. Thus the final real interface in real usage has been 'selected' from a finite set of 'real candidates' according to some 'predefined criteria' of 'good usage'.


THE CONTEXT OF AAI is not 'hard-wired' but can be chosen freely. Experience shows us that it is always helpful to fix the conditions under which we want to do our work. What do we presuppose if we start our work? What are

<sup>1</sup> For a first introduction see the two human-computer interaction handbooks from 2003 and 2008, and here especially the first chapters dealing explicitly with the history of HCI (cf. Richard W. Pew (2003) , which is citing several papers and books with additional historical investigations (cf. p.2), and Jonathan Grudin (2008) . Another source is the 'HCI Bibliography: Human-Computer Interaction Resources' (see: <http://www.hcibib.org/>), which has a rich historical section too (see: <http://www.hcibib.org/hci-sites/history>).

Richard W. Pew. Introduction. Evolution of human-computer interaction: From memex to bluetooth and beyond. In J.A. Jacko and A. Sears, editors, *The Human-Computer Interaction Handbook. Fundamentals, Evolving Technologies, and emerging Applications*. 1 edition, 2003; and Jonathan Grudin. A Moving Target: The Evolution of HCI. In A. Sears and J.A. Jacko, editors, *The Human-Computer Interaction Handbook. Fundamentals, Evolving Technologies, and emerging Applications*. 2 edition, 2008

our assumptions? What are possible 'frameworks' we are using?

The approach in this book is highly influenced by the paradigm of 'Systems Engineering (SE)' as it is very common in the engineering world. System Engineering can be understood as a bet on the future: given a problem, follow some procedures, and there is some chance, that you will find a solution which can be implemented successfully. The main standards are texts representing the experience of thousands of experts of many thousands of realized projects. What the standards describe is the idealized format of a 'process' with a 'start' and an 'end'. The process is realized by some finite set of 'actors' which coordinate their 'actions' by 'communication', including different kinds of 'artifacts'. We will not speak about systems engineering too much here, but at least let us give a basic idea what it is and how it is related to the main topic 'Actor-Actor Interaction (AAI)' (cf. figure 1.1).<sup>2</sup>.



'Inside' of a systems engineering process you find different actors called 'experts' which with their experience will drive the process. Outside of the process you have those actors which have to 'manage' the process called 'managers'.

A systems engineering process is always part of some 'economical system' which in turn is part of a 'societal system'. The 'economical system' is the source of many rules for 'how to play the game': available resources, conditions of exchange, gains and losses. Making a systems engineering process an 'economic success' you have to comply with the economic rules. But the economic system is also always interacting with a 'societal system' too: value systems imply preferences and rules to be followed in a variety of different ways, and cultural and human centered patterns will induce additional constraints, which can conflict each other.<sup>3</sup>

Across society and economy we have the realm of 'science' and of 'engineering & technology'. The domain of 'science' manifests themselves as a multitude of distinguished single disciplines whose coherence and unity is only partially in existence. But if you want to know how 'nature' behaves then you have to consult these disciplines. Based on science and as well on collected 'experiences' from many fields and situations we have 'engineering' as a unification of science, craftsmanship, and art, which

<sup>2</sup> For a first introduction into the idea of *systems engineering (SE)* cf. INCOSE (2015) INCOSE:2015 Figure 1.1: A simplified picture of the different contexts for a systems engineering process

<sup>3</sup> Two popular texts which illustrate the interplay of society, technology, and engineering in a broad scope are Eric Schmidt and Jared Cohen (2013) and Yuval Noah Harari (2018) .

Eric Schmidt and Jared Cohen. *The New Digital Age. Reshaping the Future of People, Nations and Business*. John Murray, London (UK), 1 edition, 2013. URL <https://www.google.com/search?client=ubuntu&channel=fs&q=eric+schmidt+the+new+digital+age+pdf&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8>; and Yuval Noah Harari. *21 Lessons for the 21st Century*. Spiegel & Grau, Penguin Random House, New York, 2018

transforms ideas in working artifacts, which often are machines and whole cities. 'Technology' is one possible outcome of engineering; technology supports the daily life in more and more areas.


Finally, all these mentioned systems are embedded in an overall 'natural system', the earth as part of the universe, inducing many very strong constraints, which to follow is strongly recommended.

To describe this complex matter in detail would burst all boundaries. Therefore we will focus only on that part of the systems engineering process, where AAI comes in and we will thematise the different contexts of a systems engineering process from within the AAI sub-process where it is needed.

THE STRUCTURE OF A SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESS has been described in a formal way by Louwrence Erasmus and Gerd Doeben-Henisch during 2011, when they did some 'conceptual experiments' looking how to formalize a systems engineering process (cf. Erasmus & Doeben-Henisch (2011a/b) <sup>4</sup>)

Inspired by modern mathematics (cf. Bourbaki <sup>5</sup>) and the structural approach within philosophy of science (cf. Sneed <sup>6</sup>, Balzer et.al. <sup>7</sup>) they pointed out an algebraic structure which can help to describe the elements as well the dynamics of the process. In the following we give a basic description of the main idea restricted to the AAI-analysis phase.

THE AAI-ANALYSIS PART OF A SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESS (SEP) is depicted in the figure 1.2.



The AAI-analysis phase is assumed to be 'framed' by a clear beginning and a clear end. The 'beginning' is located in the existence of a 'problem document'  $D_P$ , which has been produced by some 'real stakeholder'  $A_{SH.Real}$  together with some real AAI-experts  $A_{AAI.Real}$ ; these AAI-experts can be extended by some other real experts  $A_{X.Real}$ . The problem document  $D_P$  describes, what kind of a 'problem' the stakeholder sees and what

<sup>4</sup> Louwrence Erasmus and Gerd Doeben-Henisch. A theory of the system engineering process. In *9th IEEE AFRICON Conference*. IEEE, 2011a; and Louwrence Erasmus and Gerd Doeben-Henisch. A theory of the system engineering management processes. In *ISEM 2011 International Conference*. ISEM, 2011b. Conference 2011, September 21-23, Stellenbosch, South Africa

<sup>5</sup> N. Bourbaki. *Éléments de Mathématique. Théorie des Ensembles*. Hermann, Paris, 1 edition, 1970

<sup>6</sup> J. D. Sneed. *The Logical Structure of Mathematical Physics*. D.Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht - Boston - London, 2 edition, 1979

<sup>7</sup> W. Balzer, C. U. Moulines, and J. D. Sneed. *An Architectonic for Science*. D.Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht (NL), 1 edition, 1987

Figure 1.2: Simplified picture of the systems engineering process focussing on the AAI-analysis phase

kind of an 'improvement' he wants. Mostly the 'wishes' of the stakeholder are 'framed' by a set of 'constraints' which have to be matched within the envisaged 'improvements'.<sup>8</sup>

THE AAI-ANALYSIS IN A BACKWARD VIEW: Having a 'beginning' of the AAI-analysis and an 'end' one can ask, which steps are necessary to reach the end from the defined beginning? For to do this one can start with the end and asking back: what are the pre-conditions to get the real interface candidates  $A_{Intf.Real}$  for the final tests?

Here it is assumed that the 'real interfaces' are 'derived' from symbolically described abstract models of 'assisting actors' ( $A_{ass}$ ) which are 'used' by some symbolically described abstract 'executing actors' ( $A_{exec}$ )<sup>9</sup> to fulfill some 'task' (T) within a symbolically describable 'finite sequence of actions' constituting an 'abstract process'; the symbolical description of such an abstract process is called an 'actor story' (AS).

Thus, whether the proposed real interfaces are in some sense 'sound' is depending from such an actor story, which describes the intended format of the proposed 'improvements' by taking into account the different constraints mentioned by the stakeholder.

From this follows a very strong assumption implicitly given with this kind of an AAI-approach: the 'problem' (P) described in the problem document  $D_P$  can be translated into a sequence of states with at least one start state and at least one goal state, and these states contain intended executive actors  $A_{exec}$ , needed assistive actors  $A_{ass}$ , a certain 'environment' (ENV) where these processes are assumed to happen, additionally needed 'artifacts' (OBJ), and at least one 'task' (T) which has to be 'fulfilled' by such a process. Possible 'constraints' (C) given as 'non-functional requirements' (NFRs) have to be defined as sets of decidable properties distributed across the different states of the whole process.

That this strong assumption is a 'sound' assumption will be demonstrated in this book. During the course of the arguments you will encounter within the overall AAI-Analysis further special topics like 'Modeling behavior and actors', 'Integrating learning intelligent actors', 'Simulation of actor stories and actor models', 'Automatic verification of non-functional requirements', 'Design of real interfaces', and 'Testing of usability with learning actors and embedded simulations'. Finally you will find several paragraphs pointing to 'philosophical aspects' of this approach which allow a new kind of integration of all these different views.

<sup>8</sup> We know that the assumption of a ready made problem document  $D_P$  is very strong, because the elaboration of such a document is a real challenge and worth a book on it's own.

<sup>9</sup> traditionally called 'user'.

## 2

# Outline

### 2.1 Symbolic Space and the Real World




Figure 2.1: The symbolic space of the Actor Story (AS), which then has to become instantiated by real actors with the aid of a real system

Figure 2.1 shows the *symbolic space* of an *actor story (AS)* which has been constructed according to some *stated problem (P)* and an envisioned *solution idea (S+)*. This symbolic space communicates ideas about intended *executing* and *assisting actors (eA, aA)* which are first located in a *start state (S\*)* and which can *change* the actual state by doing some actions which cause some change in an actual state generating thereby a *follow-up state (S')*. If one wants to describe the behavior of an actor with more details about the inner structure of an actor then one has to construct additionally an explicit *actor model (AM)* of this actor describing all the known behavior by explaining the internal dynamics.

To check whether these symbolically described possible states of the actor story are working in the *real world (RW)* one has to *instantiate* the intended actors and organize some *test*. This can be done in various *simulations* (including gaming), but the most advanced test will be a *usability test*. In a usability test *real actors* – as close as possible to the finally intended actors – will try to realize the states of an actor story with the aid of a mock-up. A mock-up is a physical device which represents all the

important properties of the finally intended assistant actor. The outcome of this usability is either that the symbolic description is fully working in the real world or not. If the test shows deficiencies between the symbolic actor story and the real test then this can reveal some important properties which could be enable a better follow-up test.

## 2.2 The AS Construction Process




Figure 2.2: Outline of all main elements used in this version of the AAI paradigm

The following text provides an *outline* of all main elements used in an *AAI paradigm*.

All these elements following mainly a sequential procedure. But because this procedure is to a wide extend also an *exploratory* process it is important to *repeat* individual steps or even the whole process if at the end the simulations and/ or tests provide insights in deficiencies. Therefore one has to see this whole sequential process as a *repetitive* process. This recommends to start with as simple as possible assumptions, construct with these assumptions step wise the whole process and get some experience of the effect of all parts working together.

**PROBLEM-SOLUTION:** Every AAI analysis process presupposes a defined *problem statement*  $D_p$  combined with a first idea about a *wanted solution*  $D_s$ .

**AAI-CHECK:** To accept the given problem with the wanted solution one has to check, whether the following *minimal conditions* are fulfilled:

1. The *context* ( $ENV$ ) of the wanted solution is characterized.
2. There is at least one *task* ( $T$ ) given which has to be realized within the solution to do the job.

3. There is at least one *executive actor* ( $eA$ ) which has to fulfill the task as well as at least one *assistive actor* ( $aA$ ) who shall support the executive actor in doing his job.

*NFRs*: If the AAI check is positive then one has to give some additional *non-functional requirements* (*NFRs*) if necessary.

*DOMAIN KNOWLEDGE*: While the AAI framework as such is a *general framework* intended for all kinds of problems you will need a *special domain knowledge* – often located in so-called *experts* – which allows the inference of the needed facts for the states and the change rules.

*ACTOR STORY*: To analyze the details of the wanted solution within the intended environment with the implicit tasks and participating actors one has to develop a so-called *actor story* (*AS*).

The AS consists of a series of *states* ( $S$ ) with at least one *start state* ( $S^*$ ) and at least one *goal state* ( $S_+$ ). A state is a collection of *facts* ( $F$ ) which can be decided as *true* or not in the assumed environment. Some of the facts describe different *actors* ( $A$ ) with the executive and the assistive actors as subsets ( $eA \cup aA \subseteq A$ ).

If something is *changing* then a state  $S.b$  before the change  $E$  converts into a *successor* or *follow-up state*  $S.f$ . Changes are described by *change rules* ( $X$ ). If there exists more than one option to change a state alternatively then the actor story splits up into different lines of state sequences. Possibly these different lines of states can *unify* again at some point later. There can also be a change which effects in some *loop back* if a state has to be repeated again.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> A more detailed discussion of 'change' you can find in chapter 5.

*CONSTRUCTING SUCCESSOR STATES*: In a *first construction phase* the AAI experts have to clarify which are the most important states which have to be assumed to enable an actor story which leads from a start state  $S^*$  to a goal state  $S_+$ . And for this they have to identify those *change-rules*  $X$  which connect the different identified states. This first construction phase leads to a structure which can *mathematically* be represented as a *graph* ( $G$ ). A graph can be turned into an *automaton* which is able to *simulate* this graph  $G$ . This gives the foundation for a possible *simulator*  $\sigma$ . And as will be shown later this simulator  $\sigma$  can be built in a general way such that one can implement an appropriate algorithm (software) in a real computer to be able to be used by the AAI experts to simulate any kind of an actor story description.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> If a change is triggered by an actor which is *not completely deterministic* than a change can have some variability associated with probabilities which can change. Such a feature turns a complete process into a minimal grade of *uncertainty*. The outcome will not be predictable.

*ACTOR AS A LEARNING SYSTEM*: In the context of an actor story it is assumed that every actor is principally a *learning system* (*LS*) with inputs, outputs, internal states as well as a learning function. This leads to the following basic structure of an actor:

$$A(x) \text{ iff } x = \langle I, O, IS, \phi \rangle \quad (2.1)$$

$$I := \text{Set of inputs} \quad (2.2)$$

$$O := \text{Set of outputs} \quad (2.3)$$

$$IS := \text{Set of internal states} \quad (2.4)$$

$$\phi : I \times IS \mapsto IS \times O \quad (2.5)$$

These assumptions allow for first basic classifications: (i) If the set of internal states (IS) is *empty* or *static*, then the system is principally unable to *learn*. It has to have a completely fixed behavior function which makes the system a *deterministic* system. If there exist internal states *and* these are *changeable*, then the system can principally be a *learning* system, which turns a deterministic behavior function into a *non-deterministic* function.

**ACTOR AS ACTOR MODEL:** If one wants to describe the details of the learning function of an actor including the details of the main sets {I, O, IS} one has to construct an *actor model (AM)* outside the main actor story. While the actor story is looking to the actors from the *outside* describing how they *behave*, how they *act* in a *situation*<sup>3</sup>, an actor model (AM) is looking to an actor from *inside*, from the *internal states and processes*<sup>4</sup>

<sup>3</sup> This is called the *3rd person view* by philosophers

<sup>4</sup> This is called *1st person view* from philosophers

**INTERFACING AS AND AMs:** The *interface* between an *actor story (AS)* and some *actor models (AMs)* is given by the inputs and outputs of an actor. If the actor story describes a certain *action* of an actor, its *output*, then the actor model must *explain* how this output has been generated inside the actor. In the same manner if the actor story describes some *input* to an actor then the actor model must *explain* what happens in the actor on account of such an input. How can an input to an actor influence his output.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>5</sup> For a more detailed discussion see the chapters 4 and 5.

### 2.3 Testing An Actor Story

If an actor story AS has been constructed one has to check the *cognitive plausibility* of the actor story as well as the *usability* of the intended assistive actors (aAs) by the intended users.

The *cognitive plausibility* is located in the relationship between the *knowledge of the stakeholder* and the possible *experience* when *testing the actor story in a simulation*. If the real experience within a simulation *differs* from the given experience in the brains of the stakeholders than the cognitive plausibility of the actor story is low, eventually too low.

The *usability* of the intended assistive actors (aAs) is located in the relationship between the intended executive actors (eA) and a preliminary mock-up of the intended assistive actors (aA). While the intended executive actor tries to realize a process which is in agreement with the actor story it has to be *empirically measured* (i) to which degree the intended executive actors are *able to realize the actor story with this mock-up* and (ii) it should

be *subjectively measured* to which degree the intended executive actor is *satisfied* with this process *in an emotional dimension*.

**SIMULATION:** Having an actor story AS and an *assisting simulator software*  $\sigma$  one can realize a *simulation*, either (i) purely *passive* without interactions or (ii) with *interactions*. In the case of an *interactive simulation* real actors can interact with the simulation and thereby *influence the course of the simulation*. A simulation enables a *shared experience* with a *common understanding* in all participants of the simulation. The *simulation experience* can be compared with the available *real-world experience* of the participants and this allows a special kind of a *cognitive test* revealing those aspects of the simulation which *differ* from the known reality. These *experienced differences* can shed some light on either *deficiencies* of the *simulation* or deficiencies of the *real world situation*.

The introduction of actor models (AMs) simultaneously to an actor story (AS) does not change the concept of a simulation. Actor models occur in the format of a change-rule which in turn is connected to an algorithm which defines its computations.

**GAMING:** If one extends an interactive simulation with the definition of explicit *win-lose states* then one can turn a simulation into a *game* with real actors which can compete and where some of the participant can become *winners*. Compared to simulations with their somehow *infinite* possibilities identifies a game in advance some *special states of interest* which narrows the scope of the analysis. This helps to focus the test of the process to these special states of interest and enables a much *faster clarification of research questions*. In this sense is *gaming* the *more efficient way of learning* by simulation.

**VERIFICATION OF NFRs; ORACLE:** If one has defined some NFRs (non-functional requirements) for the actor story then one can after the completion of an actor story including simulation *verify* whether the NFRs are *true* in the actor story with regard to the assumed environment *or not*. A special case of the verification of NFRs is the *oracle* function. Because the verification of NFRs is done in the manner of an *automated prove* with regard to the existence or non-existence of some defined property (associated with a NFR), one can use this mechanism also for to *check* whether a *special state of interest* will *occur or not occur* within a *defined time window* of *all* possible simulations. Such a mechanism can be of great help for the analysis of the possible future of a process, especially without having the need to do *all* the possible (interactive) simulations which is practically impossible on account of the needed time. But because such an oracle-process can only work with the given change-rules *as if these will not change* and without the *non-deterministic behavior of real executive actors* the oracle-results have to be used with caution.

**NEED FOR MOCK-UPS:** Until that point there exist only *symbolic descriptions* about possible real states. To turn the symbolic descriptions into a *real working system* one has to implement these descriptions into a real system.

But such a full *implementation* is not the job of the AAI analysis. The AAI analysis only examines possible states and possible behavior profiles and checks with the aid of mock-ups whether these ideas will work sufficiently well. *Mock-ups* are physical systems which show all the main physical properties of the intended system without being a full implementation of this system.

*USABILITY TESTING:* *Usability* reveals something about the way how good the interaction of the intended executive actors with the intended assistive actor works within the whole actor story. Some of the questions which shall be answered by an usability test are: Is it too difficult for the executing actor to *learn* the needed behavior? Does the executing actor need *too much time*? Do continuously occur *too many errors*? To answer these and similar questions one has to prepare a *test scenario* which allows a real executing actor to behave according to the actor story by using the intended assistive actor realized as a *mock-up*. This test has to be managed by a *test coordinator* assisted by some *observing persons* or/ and *recording devices* to produce a *protocol* of the events during the test. The protocols have then to be converted into *test data* which can be used for analytical purposes.

A special point in the AAI usability testing is that within the AAI framework it is generally assumed that the executive actors are by default *learning systems*(which holds for all biological systems). This means that the executive actors eA all have an individual *behavior function*  $\phi$ . This induces within a testing procedure the possible effects that the behavior of a executing actor can change from test to test.<sup>6</sup> To restrict the usability test therefore to only one test run is highly dangerous. It is recommended to *repeat an usability test at least three times*. What number  $n$  has to be assumed to be the *optimal* number is still an unanswered question.

<sup>6</sup> Which is indeed the normal case. Therefore you can find in all reports about learning experiments always so-called *learning curves* representing these changes along a time line.

### 3

## *Define a Problem*

*Define a Problem:* Because the *space of possible problems and visions* is nearly infinite one has to define as a starting point for a certain process a *problem* together with a *first vision of a 'better state of the affairs'*. This is realized by a description of the problem in a *problem document*  $D_p$  as well as in a *vision statement*  $D_v$ . Because usually a vision is not without a given context one has to add such an assumed *environment (ENV)* with all the *constraints (C)* which have to be taken into account for the possible solution. Examples of constraints are *non-functional requirements (NFRs)* like 'safety' or 'real time' or 'without barriers' (for handicapped people).

A problem description as well as the first vision of a better state of affairs have to include furthermore at least one *task (TA)* to be fulfilled and some *intended executive actors (eA)* which are *biological* systems; without such biological system there is no need for an AAI analysis.

*For an example* of a problem description with some envisioned solution see chapter ?? of this text.



## 4

# Actor Story

**OBJECTIVE FOR AN ACTOR STORY:** Given a problem document  $D_p$  and a first vision document  $D_v$  it is the task of an *actor actor interaction (AAI) analysis* to analyze the necessary *process* to begin with some *start state*  $S^*$  and to reach at least one *goal state*  $S^+$ . The participating *executive actors*  $eA$  can reach the goal state  $S^+$  by doing some *actions* which induce *changes* into the given states. For the realization of the task the executive actor will be supported by an *assistive Actor (aA)* which can also *respond* to actions of the executive actor while having some *perceptions* of what the executive actor is doing.

### 4.1 BASIC ELEMENTS OF AN AS

**CREATING A SYMBOLIC REPRESENTATION:** This *intended process*  $p_i$  enabling a transformation of a start state into a goal state does not yet exist in the real world; it is first a purely *cognitive model* of such a possible process. On account of this cognitive character the intended virtual model  $p_i$  can only be communicated by a *symbolic expression*  $E$  from some *language*  $L$  embedded in a *meaning relation*. Thus the elaboration/ construction of the intended process by AAI experts will be realized by using appropriate expressions embedded in a meaning relation, known by the AAI experts. This allows a basic mapping of *sensor based perceptions* in the AAI experts into some *abstract virtual (cognitive) structures* which all are automatically (unconsciously) computed by the *brain*.

**MODES OF SYMBOLIC EXPRESSIONS:** In this text especially three types of symbolic expressions  $E$  will be used: (i) *pictorial expressions*  $E_{pict}$ , (ii) *textual expressions* of a *natural language*  $E_{nat}$ , and (iii) *textual expressions* of a *mathematical language*  $E_{math}$ . The *meaning* part of these symbolic expressions as well as the expressions itself will be called here an actor story (AS) with the different modes *pictorial AS (PAS)*, *textual AS (TAS)*, as well as *mathematical AS (MAS)*.

**STATES AS BASIC ELEMENTS OF AN AS:** The basic elements of an *actor story (AS)* are *states* ( $S$ ) which represent sets of *facts* ( $F$ ). A fact is an expression of some defined language  $L$  which can be *decided* as *being true in a real situation or not* (the past and the future are special cases for such truth clarifications). Some of the facts are describing objects which can

be identified as *actors* which can *act by their own*. The *transformation* from one state to a follow up state has to be described with *sets of change-rules* ( $X$ ). The combination of states and change-rules defines mathematically a *directed graph* ( $G$ ).

Applying a change-rule onto an *actual state*  $S^*$  induces a *change* to a *successor state*  $S'$ . If there exists more than one option to change a state in an exclusive way then the actor story splits up into different lines of state sequences. Possibly these different lines of states can *unify* again at some point later. There can also be a change which effects in some *loop back* if a state has to be repeated again.

**CONSTRUCTING SUCCESSOR STATES:** In a *first construction phase* the AAI experts have to clarify which are the most important states which have to be assumed to enable an actor story which leads from a start state  $S^*$  to a goal state  $S_+$ . And for this they have to identify those *change-rules*  $X$  which connect the different identified states. This first construction phase leads to a structure which can *mathematically* be represented as a *graph* ( $G$ ). A graph can be turned into an *automaton* which is able to *simulate* this graph  $G$ . This gives the foundation for a possible *simulator*  $\sigma$ . And as will be shown later this simulator  $\sigma$  can be built in a general way such that one can implement an appropriate algorithm (software) in a real computer to be able to be used by the AAI experts to simulate any kind of an actor story description.

**CHANGE-RULE(s):** The transformation of one actual state  $S^*$  into a successor state  $S_+$  is the result of the *application of a change-rule*  $x \in X$  onto the actual state  $S^*$  like *change* :  $S \times X \mapsto S$ , or *change*( $S^*, x$ ) =  $S'$ .<sup>1</sup>

**UNIFYING STATES:** If one defines *different* actor stories with different sets of states and edges<sup>2</sup> then the question can arise how one can *synchronize* these different subsystems. There are some cases to distinguish:

1. If there are n-many different states to unify then one declares a new *super-state* where all the other states are *sub-states*.
2. If there are no relations between the sub-states then nothing else will happen. Every sub-state will be processed with its own change-rules as before.
3. If there shall exist a new relation  $R$  between two before different states, then there must in every participating state of the relation a variable be created which will be part of the relation. Change rules can then become influential to another state if the new relation  $R$  makes an influence explicit. **Example:** If one actor story AS1 deals with the population dynamics of a city with a population POP, the birth-rate BR and the death-rate DR, and another actor story AS2 deals with the water-supply for this city with the actual water reservoir WR, the possible input to this water reservoir from some spring SPR, and the water consumption of the city WCN. Unifying both systems would require to relate the population POP with the water consumption WCN by some new mapping like

<sup>1</sup> For a more elaborated view on changes see the next chapter ?? about actor models.

<sup>2</sup> Think about a city with different subsystems for demography, budget, water supply etc.

wcnpop(POP)=WCN. For to extend the two old actor stories AS1 and AS2 to a new unified story  $AS_{12} = AS_1 \cup AS_2$  one has then only to add some new change-rule wcnpop() to the unified list of change rules  $X_{12} = X_1 \cup X_2 \cup \{wcnpop()\}$ .

From this follows that the unification of before separated actor stories AS1 and AS2 requires in the worst case the introduction of new change-rules associating two before unconnected variables with a new function. This induces a *cognitive enrichment* of both actor stories in the unified version.

#### 4.2 EXAMPLE OF AN AS

*Textual Actor Story (TAS):* Here a simple text representing a textual version of this actor story:

1. *START:* There is an electronic door D with a keypad K. The door is closed. Before the door stands a person A, which is able to enter a code C into the keypad K.
2. *ENTERING KEY:* The person A enters a code C into the keypad K.
3. *GOAL:* The door is open.

*Pictorial Actor Story (PAS):* The following figure 4.1 shows a simple pictorial actor story:




Figure 4.1: Pictorial actor story (PAS) showing an executive actor before a closed door with an electronic key. Entering the key-code the door opens.

*Mathematical Actor Story (MAS):* In the following you see a graphical representation of an actor story with the formulas embedded in the graph.

The mathematical version of an actor story (MAS) (cf. figure 4.2 shows the actor story as graph with mathematical formulas and some additional *meta-information*.

An ordinary mathematical graph is defined as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \gamma(g) \quad & \text{iff } g = \langle V, E \rangle & (4.1) \\
 V & := \text{vertices} \\
 E & := \text{edges} \\
 E & \subseteq V \times V
 \end{aligned}$$

In case of a mathematical actor story (MAS) this basic graph is extended by some mappings. So called *facts (F)* are attached to vertices and so called *change rules (X)* are attached to the vertices:




Figure 4.2: Structure of the mathematical actor story (MAS)

$$\gamma^+(g) \text{ iff } g = \langle V, E, F, \Xi, \lambda, \epsilon \rangle \quad (4.2)$$

$V := \text{vertices}$   
 $E := \text{edges}$   
 $E \subseteq V \times V$   
 $F := \text{Fact expressions}$   
 $\Xi := \text{Change expressions}$   
 $\lambda : V \rightarrow 2^F$   
 $\epsilon : E \rightarrow 2^\Xi$

In case of a *mathematical actor story (MAS)* it is further assumed that there exists a *start state*  $S_0$  and at least one *goal state*  $S^+$ . Therefore we get the following definition:

$$\text{MAS}(s) \text{ iff } g = \langle V, E, S_0, S_i^+, F, \Xi, \lambda, \epsilon \rangle \quad (4.3)$$

$V := \text{vertices}$   
 $E := \text{edges}$   
 $E \subseteq V \times V$   
 $F := \text{Fact expressions}$   
 $\Xi := \text{Change expressions}$   
 $\lambda : V \rightarrow 2^F$   
 $\epsilon : E \rightarrow 2^\Xi$   
 $S_0 \in V; \text{Start state}$   
 $S_i^+ \subseteq V; \text{Goal states}$

This is not yet a complete formal specification of the mathematical actor story but it gives you already some basic conventions how to construct a MAS. Using the before mentioned TAS we can identify a start state  $S_0$  and at least one goal state  $S^+$ .

1.  $S_0$  = A person A stands before a closed electronic door D with a keypad K...
2.  $S^+$  = The door is open...

In the *start state*  $S_0$  there are two actors: an *executing actor* as a person A and an *assisting actor* as an electronic door D with a keypad K. The electronic door has only two qualitative values: being *closed* or being *open*. The code C which can be entered into the keypad K by the person A can cause a CLOSED door to become OPEN.

In a more formal way one can then generate some expressions like these:

$$\begin{aligned}
 S_0 = & \{PERSON(A), EDOOR(D), CLOSED(D), & (4.4) \\
 & \dots KEYPAD(K), PARTOF(K, D), BEFORE(A, D), \\
 & \dots CODE(C), CANENTER(A, C, K)\}
 \end{aligned}$$

The general format of a change rule for state  $S_0$  has the following format:

- *From-to-Part*: The actual state with the possible follow-up states
- *Action-Declaration-Part*: Identify the acting actor and the other objects (actors), with which the acting actor is interacting, and label the name of the action with assumed input and output values.
- *Effect-Part*: Depending from the different output values of the action there can be different sets of effects; each set of effect defines a certain follow up state.

Applied to the above example we can define the following change rule:

- *From-to-Part*:  $S_0, \langle S_0, S_1 \rangle$
- *Action-Declaration-Part*: A,K,entercode(C)[D]
- *Effect-Part*: IF D=CLOSED THEN  $S_0$  ELSE  $S_1 = S_0 - CLOSED(D) \cup OPEN(D)$

Thus the whole change rule would look like this:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \Xi_1 = & \langle S_0, \langle S_0, S_1 \rangle, & (4.5) \\
 & \dots A, K, entercode(C)[D], \\
 & \dots IF D = CLOSED THEN S_0 ELSE S_1 = S_0 - CLOSED(D) \cup OPEN(D) \rangle
 \end{aligned}$$

This reads as follows:

There is an actual state  $S_0$  which can be changed by applying the change rule  $\Xi_1$ . This change rule can have two different outcomes depending from the output value of the change action *entercode()*. The acting actor is the human person A which is interacting with the keypad K by doing the action *entercode()* with the input variable {C} and the output variable {D}. If the *input variable* C matches some internal configuration of the electronic

door then the output variable  $D$  will have the value OPEN which will cause the new state  $S_1$ ; otherwise  $D$  will have the value CLOSED and the state  $S_0$  will not change.

What is important here is the fact that the computational part of the action *entercode()* will not be described in the actor story. The name *entercode()* of the action points to another location where this action is defined. This other location would be an *actor model (AM)*, which keeps all necessary information. In this case it could be the actor model of the electronic keypad  $K$  which receives as input some code  $C$  of the person  $A$  and reacts with opening the door.

# 5

## Actor Model Embedding

**ACTOR MODEL EMBEDDING:** In the preceding chapter 4 about the basic elements of an actor story (AS) one can talk about states as sets of facts and some of these facts can be understood as facts describing an object which has some kinds of perceptions as well as actions, but this 3rd-person view of an actor story does not allow for descriptions about the *inner states (IS)* of such an object which could *explain* the observable behavior. To talk about such inner states one has to define a separate *actor model (AM)*. To make such potential actor models *work* in interaction with an actor story one has to define this interaction in a precise way. The primary interface for such an *actor story - actor model interaction* are the *changes* which turn a *before-state S.b* into *follow-up state S.f*. Such a *change* is defined by the change of at least one fact *f* which either will be *deleted* from *S.b* to *S.f* or will be *created* from *S.b* to *S.f*.

### 5.1 Rewriting the Change as an Actor

**LOCATE AN ACTOR WITHIN A CHANGE:** To understand the interaction of actors in connection with an actor story one must understand the structure of an observable change between two states.

**CHANGE AS OBSERVABLE EFFECT:** As described in the chapter 4 about the actor story (AS) an actor story can be understood as a directed graph whose nodes are states as sets of facts and the connecting directed edges are possible changes. A *change (X)* is described by the differences in the sets of facts between the *before-state (S.b)* and the *follow-up state (S.f)*. With regard to change the following cases are possible: (i) a fact *F* from the before-state *S.b* will *disappear* in the follow-up state *S.f* represented as *-F* or (ii) a fact *F* in the follow-up state *is new* compared to the before-state represented as *+F*. This set of *deleted facts -F* together with the *newly created facts +F* is called the *effect of the change (N.e)* with  $N.e = \{-F, +F\}$ . As soon as one can identify some effect *N.e* one can look for a possible *source (N.s)* in the realm of the before-state. A source *N.s* is a subset of the facts of *S.b* which can be identified as preceding the observable effect. Having a possible source *N.s* then one can observe with some probability *p.i* that the observable fact will occur within a certain time-frame  $\Delta$  defined by two time points  $(t, t')$  (cf. figure 5.1).




Figure 5.1: The cognition of observable changes

**THE COGNITION OF CHANGES:** If one tries to analyze the *language game* associated with observable changes then one encounters some difficulties. While an object  $o$  usually has some *permanence* one can talk about such an object  $o$  by pointing to this object and using names  $N.o$ . If a change happens, the *previous state*  $S.b$  which did change will *disappear* in its original format and will be *replaced* by a *follow-up state*  $S.f$  revealing something *new*. In everyday language we have no problem to talk about changes with appropriate names  $N.x$  similar to talking about objects, but looking closer one can detect a real difference: although we assume that the new follow-up state  $S.f$  can be recognized as new because he is *different* to the preceding state  $S.b$ , in the real world this difference is not present. If one assumes that every observer has *inner states* which enable some *memory* with the additional capability to *remember* stored items and being able to *compare* remembered items with new, present items, then one can explain that we can talk about changes and being able to name the differences *based on these cognitive representations and operations*. This is depicted in the right half of the figure 5.1. The figure shows a simple model of a minimal cognitive structure with the elements (i) *storing* perceptions as re-callable items; (ii) being able to *compare* stored items with regard to possible differences; (iii) *identifying possible sources* for such effects together with probabilities as well as probable time frames for the occurrence of the effect.

If one makes the assumption that the identified probability  $p$  is 'part of a probability space' with  $\sum(p_i) = 1$  then one has to assume that a source  $N.s$  can be associated with different kinds of effects  $\{N.e_1, \dots, N.x_k\}$  which are exclusive. This means that an actor story with an identified source  $N.x$  having different probabilities  $p_i$  can have different follow-up states  $\{S.f_1, \dots, S.f_k\}$ ; thus the path containing the state  $S$  with the source  $N.s$  will be splitted up into different continuations.

The process of the identification of a possible source  $N.s$  for an observed effect  $N.x$  hides another cognitive property, that of *pre-knowledge*. To state that some facts are indeed an *effect*  $N.x$  and not only some kind of a *difference* presupposes that one is able to *embed* observed differences in some *cognitive (=abstract) relation* which relates the observed differences to some source  $N.x$ . Such a relation is a cognitive fact which belongs to what usually is called *knowledge*, which is assumed to be located in the inner states of an observer. Without such a knowledge there wouldn't exist relations and

without relations there wouldn't it be possible to identify a source for some differences turning the differences into a possible effect. Thus the *detection* of something as being a possible *source* for an observed effect is completely depending from a presupposed knowledge. Science has many examples for detections of differences as effects of some presupposed sources.<sup>1</sup>

**MULTIPLE SOURCES:** If there exists only one source  $N.s$  then possible *different* effects  $N.x$  are exclusive: only one of the possible effects can happen at the same time. Nevertheless the whole actor story AS has to be splitted up from that state onward which shows these alternatives. But there can be more than one source in one state  $\{N.s_1, \dots, N.s_k\}$  and every source  $N.s_i$  can have its own special effects  $N.e_i$ . While for each single source  $N.s_i$  there can only one of many effects happen at the same time, each source  $N.s_i$  can generate one effect  $N.e_i$ , and *these different effects are simultaneous!* And because a real situation does not split up into alternatives *all* these effects have to be *unified in one follow-up state S.f.*

This induces the question how one can unify more than one effect in one follow-up state S.f?

<sup>1</sup> One of many examples in science: Only in 1964 it happened that two American radio astronomers detected signals in their data (= the differences, which can become effects) which they discussed with their colleagues and then came to the conclusion (= because of presupposed knowledge about possible relations) to *interpret* the signals as the *cosmic microwave background (CMB, CMBR)* (= the differences became effects within a relation), which could be a remnant from an early stage of the universe (= the possible source of the effect), also known as relic radiation. This interpretation presupposed as knowledge a complex physical theory about the development of the universe (cf. PenziasWilson:1965).




Figure 5.2: Condition for unifying different effects in one state

One possible direction for an answer is the *meaning dimension* of the used expressions. Every source  $N.s$  is a set of *expressions* where each expression is classified as a *fact*. In the standard situation the AAI expert has in his cognitive space an *encoding schema* translating a fact-expression  $F$  into some *intended matter* which realizes the possible meaning of the expression. But there is a difference: the intended meaning in the *cognitive space*  $M.cog(F)$  and the meaning in the *real world*  $M.real(F)$ . There are three basic cases: (i)  $M.real(F)$  matches the intended meaning  $M.cog(F)$  (then the expression is called *true*, indicated often as '1'); (ii)  $M.real(F)$  contradicts the intended meaning  $M.cog(F)$  directly (then the expression is called *false*, indicated often as '0'); (iii) The relation between the intended meaning  $M.cog(F)$  to the real world is unclear, because there is no matter, which seems to correspond to  $M.real(F)$ . Then the status of the expressions  $F$  in

the real world is *undefined*.<sup>2</sup>

Within these basic cases of being *true*, *false* or *undefined* there are some more detailed cases possible. In the real world one has identified some basic *laws*, which define some *constraints* for the matching of expressions to matter. Here some basic cases:

1. No two different objects can occupy the same space at the same time.
2. An object  $x$  can not have at the same time property  $F$  as well as  $\neg F$ .
3. An object  $x$  can not stay at the same time in a relation  $R$  to some other object  $y$  and not  $\neg R$ .
4. An object  $x$  can not have for a property  $F$  within a defined interval  $\pm \epsilon$  the value  $v$  and not.

From this follows that the facts which are part of an effect  $N.e$  of some source  $N.s$  have to be clarified with regard to these *truth conditions* of the presupposed real world. If one assumes that between two effects  $N.e_i$  and  $N.e_j$  is always a minimal *time delay* such that the one effect is *earlier* than the other effect then the realization of the earlier effect *comes first*. Nevertheless it has to be defined what happens if one effect *touches* another effect *some time later*. In many real world situations the hitting of one object by another is not only possible but often intended (some kinds of sports, accidents, battle situations in war, etc.).

**VIRTUAL WORLDS:** In the preceding section only the case of a real world and of the cognitive space of an expert living in the real world is assumed. In science, education, engineering, and different kinds of training *parts of the real world* are *substituted* by a *model world* which mimics important aspects of the real world or plays with a *fantasy world* to explore new dimensions. In these cases the *meaning of the real world*  $M_{real}$  has to be substituted by a constructed *artificial meaning relation*  $M_{virtual}$ .

**SOURCE AS AN ACTOR:** An important case of a special format of a source is a source structured as an *input-output system* representing an *actor* ( $A$ ). An actor includes a *behavior function*  $\phi$  which defines the *output* ( $O$ ) as response to the *input* ( $I$ ) with some sensitivity for the *internal states* ( $IS$ ), which can change, written as  $\phi : I \times IS \mapsto IS \times O$

Depending from these basic assumptions about an actor one has to require that a *source*  $N.s$  which shall be recognized as an actor must consist of a subset of the facts  $F_{S,b}$  of the state-before  $S.b$ , which can be divided into three further subsets: (i) there is a subset representing an *input-output system* assumed to be the *actor* as an object; (ii) there is another subset of facts which are presupposed as an *input* to the actor; (iii) there is a further subset of facts related to those facts, which can become changed by the actor as the actors *output*. The actors output then will be assumed to *trigger the observable effect*.

As it is known from the real world with the biological systems the same part of the environment – a set of facts as possible input – can be perceived in a different way by different kinds of biological actors. The same holds for

<sup>2</sup> In modern logic such a 3-valued truth system has been extended to many-valued cases or so-called *fuzzy* systems. But this does not change the basic structure. It gives only more flexibility in practical applications.




Figure 5.3: Source is an actor with input and output

different kinds of robots. This repeats for the output of a system which can have different effects for the environment.

To take this individual conditions into account it will here be assumed that for every actor there exists an *individual input sensor function*  $\sigma$  mapping the subset of facts representing the possible input  $I_{RW}$  into the perceived input  $I_A$  of the perceiving actor, written as  $\sigma_A : I_{RW} \mapsto I_A$ . Similarly there exists a *typical output function*  $\rho$  which translates the individual output of an actor  $O_A$  into a corresponding set of *output facts*  $O_{RW}$ , written as  $\rho_{RW} : O_A \mapsto O_{RW}$ . Examples from the real world are the way how the same movement of a body will cause completely different effects depending whether the movement has been done in the inter-planetary space, in the air on the surface of the earth or under water.

**MULTIPLE ACTORS:** As in the case of a change with a general source it is possible that there occurs more than one actor in a state. Similarly to the source case do different actors as part of a source create different possibilities of effects which have to be handled *simultaneously*. And as in the general case of a source the different effects of the different actors have to become *unified* in one follow-up state S.f.

## 5.2 How to Apply Changes?

After the introduction of the general concept of a source as part of a change and then of the special case of a source which has the format of an actor let us have a look how to apply these concepts.

1. To generate a *follow-up state* S.f for a *before.state* S.b we have to identify at least a *source* N.s and a possible *effect* N.e with *probability* p and an associated *time-frame* (t,t'). For this we could write as a *change-rule* N.x:  $\langle S.b, S.f, N.s, p, (t, t'), N.e \rangle$
2. If there are multiple effects  $\{N.e_1, \dots, N.e_k\}$  associated with *one* source N.s (obeying the constraint  $\sum(p_i) = 1$ ) then the actor story has to be splitted after the before-state S.b. Thus one has to write down multiple change-rules  $\{N.x_1, \dots, N.x_m\}$ .
3. If there are multiple sources  $\{N.s_1, \dots, N.s_k\}$  in *one* before-state S.b then it can happen that each source triggers an effect  $\{N.e_1, \dots, N.e_k\}$  and then all these effects have to be unified in the one follow-up state S.f. In this case the change rule N.x constitutes a whole set of rules like  $\{\langle S.b, S.f, N.s_1, p, (t, t'), N.e \rangle, \dots, \langle S.b, S.f, N.s_k, p, (t, t'), N.e \rangle\}$  with different kinds of probabilities, time-frames, and effects for each source  $N.s_i$ . A shortened version would read as  $\langle S.b, S.f, \langle N.s_1, p, (t, t'), N.e \rangle, \dots, \langle N.s_k, p, (t, t'), N.e \rangle \rangle$
4. Using the special case of a source as an *actor* then one has to specify additional subsets in the following way: besides the before-state S.b and the follow-up state S.f, the source N.s has to be divided into an input-set  $I_{S.b}$  with the translator function  $\sigma_A(I_{S.b}) = I_A$ , the actor-object A, a probability p with a time-frame, a translator function  $\rho_{S.b}$  of the environment to translate the actor output O into the effect N.e, which can be written:  $\langle S.b, S.f, \langle \sigma_A(I_{S.b}) = I_A, A \rangle, p, (t, t'), \rho_{S.b}(O) = N.e \rangle$ .

5. If an actor has more than one possible output it has to be handled as the case of a source with multiple different effects, i.e. the one before-state S.b has several follow-up states each with another change-rule N.x.
6. Finally, if there exists more than one actor then there exists only one follow-up state S.f – as in the case of multiple sources – but there is a whole set of change rules whose effects have to be unified.

### 5.3 Actor as a Learning System

*ACTOR AS A LEARNING SYSTEM:* In the context of an actor story it is assumed that every actor is principally a *learning system (LS)* with inputs, outputs, internal states as well as a learning function. This induces that an actor can be represented as a change-rule whose actions can cause a state-change depending from the input of the actor in an actual state.

*ACTOR AS ACTOR MODEL:* If one wants to describe the details of the learning function  $\phi$  of an actor including the details of the main sets {I, O, IS} one has to construct an *actor model (AM)* outside the main actor story. While the actor story is looking to the actors from the *outside* describing how they *behave*, how they *act* in a *situation*<sup>3</sup>, an actor model (AM) is looking to an actor from *inside*, from the *internal states and processes*<sup>4</sup>

<sup>3</sup> This is called the *3rd person view* by philosophers

<sup>4</sup> This is called *1st person view from philosophers*



# 6

## Dynamic AS and AMs Interactions

**DYNAMIC ACTORS:** It has been already stated that in the context of an actor story it is assumed that every actor is principally a *learning system (LS)* with inputs, outputs, internal states as well as a learning function. If one indeed has really learning systems, then this has far-reaching consequences for the course of an actor story.




Figure 6.1: Outline of a dynamic actor story (AS.dyn) by usage of real learning actor models (AM.learn)

Figure 4.1 shows the main outline of an actor story with really learning actors. The main points are the following ones: Every actor  $A$  of the population of participating actors has at a certain moment of time  $t$

1. some *perception*  $\pi$  of the actual environment  $E$ ,
2. some already gained *knowledge/ experience*  $K$ .
3. some *preferences (PRF)* what is more preferable in case of more than one option,
4. some possible *actions*  $\rho$ ,
5. some *learning function*  $\phi$  to compute possible changes of  $\{K, PRF, \rho\}$ .

Furthermore it is assumed that the following holds: The participating actors can

6. *interact* with each other either by
7. *communicating* with each other by using some *language (L)* or by
8. *coordinating* their behavior based on the communication.

*TAMING DYNAMIC ACTORS:* From these assumptions it follows that a *precise forecast* of all possible changes in an unrestricted dynamic actor story is not any more possible.

If one – by some reasons – is in need for a *certain course* of the actor story which can be repeated within given limits  $+/- \epsilon$  then one has to embed the learning actors into some *training processes*  $\tau$  where they will become trained to react in the states of the actor story with *prescribed responses*  $\rho$ . The prescribed responses should *match* the *prescribed actor story (AS.pre)* within some variance of  $+/- \epsilon$ .

In our *everyday world* there is a great demand of processes which fit expectations. This means that they widely are following predefined patterns. Thus there is usually no a great demand of dynamic processes. This regulates the needs for really learning artificial intelligent systems strongly.

One *side effect* of this strong bias for predefined processes is that the learning potential of real learning systems as animals and the homo sapiens is usually not exploited too much. In our everyday world *creative learning behavior* is mostly perceived as *dangerous* and un-productive.

# 7

## *AS - AM Interaction, Example 1*

*EXAMPLE 1 FOR AS-AM INTERACTION:* This text describes a simple example for an *actor story - actor model interaction*. It takes the example of a simple actor story from chapter 4. In that example 4.2 there is a person as a user and an electronic door. The person is the *executive actor (eA)* and the electronic door is the *assistive actor (aA)*. While the executive actor can be assumed as a *real learning system eA.ls* the electronic door can be assumed as *non-learning system* which hints to a *deterministic system (aA.det)*.

*DESCRIPTION OF AMs:* Analogously to the different modes to describe an actor story one can for the description of actor models use different modes of description. In this simple example the following options will be used:

1. *TEXTUAL AM:* To begin the description of an actor model one can start with some *everyday language (L)* with its weaknesses but also strengthnesses.
2. *MATHEMATICAL MAM:* One can then translate the everyday version by some *mathematical expressions (L.math)*.
3. *PROGRAMMING AAM:* Finally if one wants to implement the actor model one can translate the mathematical version further into some *programming language (L.algo)*.

*TEXTUAL AM (TAM)*: Here a simple text representing a textual version of both actor models.

**TAM for the eA.Is:**

- $\pi$  : Ther is a visual perception of the environment (7.1)  
 $K$  : It is known to enter a code C to open the door (7.2)  
 $PRF$  : Use the code C (7.3)  
 $\rho$  : Press the keys of the keypad (7.4)  
 $\phi$  : Keep the pattern stable (7.5)  
 $COM$  : No further communication necessary (7.6)

**TAM for the aA.det:**

- $\pi$  : Ther is a perception of the keys pressed (7.7)  
 $K$  : It is known to open the door after receiving code C (7.8)  
 $PRF$  : Stay with code C (7.9)  
 $\rho$  : Open the door if code C has been entered correctly (7.10)  
 $\phi$  : Follow the pattern (7.11)  
 $COM$  : No further communication necessary (7.12)

*INTERACTIONS*: Given the above TAMs one can describe the interactions of the actor story with regard to these actor models as follows:

1. *AS*: There is an electronic door D with a keypad K. The door is closed. Before the door stands a person A, which is able to enter a code C into the keypad K. *AM eA.Is*: The person sees the electronic door with its keypad closed, and while the person knows that it has to enter the code C to open the door the person decides to start the action to enter the code C. *AM aA.det*: The electronic door does not sense any key pressed therefore it stays unchanged.
2. *AS*: The person A enters a code C into the keypad K and causes an effect. *AM eA.Is*: The person pushes those keys of the keypad which correspond to the known code C. *AM aA.det*: The electronic door senses certain keys pushed. These correspond to its known code C. Therefore the electronic door opens the door.
3. *AS*: The door is open. The goal-state has been reached. *AM eA.Is*: The person perceives visually that the door has opened. The goal has been reached. *AM aA.det*: The electronic door has opened the door and stays quiet.

This approach is very informal. One still very excellent example how to formalize an actor model in accordance with empirical psychology is still the book of Card, Moran, and Newell (1983)<sup>1</sup>. They applied the whole apparatus of empirical psychology to the case of actors and their behavior. For the formalization they introduced in their chapter 5 additionally the GOMS model, which is in use until today.

<sup>1</sup> Stuart K. Card, Thomas P. Moran, and Allen Newell. *The Psychology of Human-Computer Interaction*. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., Mahwah (NJ), 1 edition, 1983

## 8

# Testing An AS

If an actor story AS has been constructed one has to check the *cognitive plausibility* of the actor story as well as the *usability* of the intended assistive actors (aAs) by the intended users.

The *cognitive plausibility* is located in the relationship between the *knowledge of the stakeholder* and the possible *experience* when *testing the actor story in a simulation*. If the real experience within a simulation *differs* from the given experience in the brains of the stakeholders than the cognitive plausibility of the actor story is low, eventually too low.

The *usability* of the intended assistive actors (aAs) is located in the relationship between the intended executive actors (eA) and a preliminary mock-up of the intended assistive actors (aA). While the intended executive actor tries to realize a process which is in agreement with the actor story it has to be *empirically measured* (i) to which degree the intended executive actors are *able to realize the actor story with this mock-up* and (ii) it should be *subjectively measured* to which degree the intended executive actor is *satisfied* with this process *in an emotional dimension*.

*SIMULATION:* Having an actor story AS and an *assisting simulator software*  $\sigma$  one can realize a *simulation*, either (i) purely *passive* without interactions or (ii) with *interactions*. In the case of an *interactive simulation* real actors can interact with the simulation and thereby *influence the course of the simulation*. A simulation enables a *shared experience* with a *common understanding* in all participants of the simulation. The *simulation experience* can be compared with the available *real-world experience* of the participants and this allows a special kind of a *cognitive test* revealing those aspects of the simulation which *differ* from the known reality. These *experienced differences* can shed some light on either *deficiencies* of the *simulation* or deficiencies of the *real world situation*.

The introduction of actor models (AMs) simultaneously to an actor story (AS) does not change the concept of a simulation. Actor models occur in the format of a change-rule which in turn is connected to an algorithm which defines its computations.

*GAMING:* If one extends an interactive simulation with the definition of explicit *win-lose states* then one can turn a simulation into a *game* with real actors which can compete and where some of the participant can become *winners*. Compared to simulations with their somehow *infinite* possibilities

identifies a game in advance some *special states of interest* which narrows the scope of the analysis. This helps to focus the test of the process to these special states of interest and enables a much *faster clarification of research questions*. In this sense is *gaming the more efficient way of learning* by simulation.

**VERIFICATION OF NFRs; ORACLE:** If one has defined some NFRs (non-functional requirements) for the actor story then one can after the completion of an actor story including simulation *verify* whether the NFRs are *true* in the actor story with regard to the assumed environment *or not*. A special case of the verification of NFRs is the *oracle* function. Because the verification of NFRs is done in the manner of an *automated prove* with regard to the existence or non-existence of some defined property (associated with a NFR), one can use this mechanism also for to *check* whether a *special state of interest* will *occur or not occur* within a *defined time window* of all possible simulations. Such a mechanism can be of great help for the analysis of the possible future of a process, especially without having the need to do *all* the possible (interactive) simulations which is practically impossible on account of the needed time. But because such an oracle-process can only work with the given change-rules *as if these will not change* and without the *non-deterministic behavior of real executive actors* the oracle-results have to be used with caution.

**NEED FOR MOCK-UPS:** Until that point there exist only *symbolic descriptions* about possible real states. To turn the symbolic descriptions into a *real working system* one has to implement these descriptions into a real system. But such a full *implementation* is not the job of the AAI analysis. The AAI analysis only examines possible states and possible behavior profiles and checks with the aid of mock-ups whether these ideas will work sufficiently well. *Mock-ups* are physical systems which show all the main physical properties of the intended system without being a full implementation of this system.

**USABILITY TESTING:** *Usability* reveals something about the way how good the interaction of the intended executive actors with the intended assistive actor works within the whole actor story. Some of the questions which shall be answered by an usability test are: Is it too difficult for the executing actor to *learn* the needed behavior? Does the executing actor need *too much time*? Do continuously occur *too many errors*? To answer these and similar questions one has to prepare a *test scenario* which allows a real executing actor to behave according to the actor story by using the intended assistive actor realized as a *mock-up*. This test has to be managed by a *test coordinator* assisted by some *observing persons* or/ and *recording devices* to produce a *protocol* of the events during the test. The protocols have then to be converted into *test data* which can be used for analytical purposes.

A special point in the AAI usability testing is that within the AAI framework it is generally assumed that the executive actors are by default *learning systems*(which holds for all biological systems). This means that the executive

actors  $eA$  all have an individual *behavior function*  $\phi$ . This induces within a testing procedure the possible effects that the behavior of a executing actor can change from test to test.<sup>1</sup> To restrict the usability test therefore to only one test run is highly dangerous. It is recommended to *repeat an usability test at least three times*. What number  $n$  has to be assumed to be the *optimal* number is still an unanswered question.

<sup>1</sup> Which is indeed the normal case. Therefore you can find in all reports about learning experiments always so-called *learning curves* representing these changes along a time line.



**Part II**

**Application**



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